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Article
Paternalism or Gender-Neutrality?
STEPHEN J. WARE
The strong and widely accepted reasons for using gender-neutral language
presumptively apply to the gendered word paternalism and its gender-neutral
counterpart, parentalism. With these reasons in mind, this Article’s thesis is that
legal scholars should begin with a presumption for using the gender-neutral word
parentalism, while using paternalism only when emphasizing the important
relevance of gender or otherwise trying to convey a gendered meaning.
Accordingly, many legal scholars define paternalism in an expressly gendered
way—such as “the institutionalization of male dominance,” or an “ideology [that]
teaches men to minimize women’s agency”—or fittingly use paternalism to describe
an attitude especially characteristic of men or directed primarily toward women.
All these many uses of the gendered word paternalism are supported by the writers’
apparent intent to emphasize the important relevance of gender to the writers’
points.
On the other hand, and despite the spread of gender-neutral language
throughout our society and legal profession, many legal scholars continue to use
the gendered word paternalism without indicating any important relevance of
gender or otherwise manifesting intent to convey a gendered meaning. These many
writers use paternalism rather than parentalism to describe laws or policies aiming
to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their choices. For example, these
writers cite “paternalism” as a standard justification for restrictions on contractual
choice or other private ordering, including the unconscionability doctrine, usury
laws, the minimum wage, and countless regulations limiting the range of
enforceable promises by consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and others.
In each of these contexts, it is better to use the gender-neutral word
parentalism, unless the writer emphasizes the relevance of gender or otherwise
manifests an intent to convey a gendered meaning. For example, a writer could
justify using the gendered word paternalism by arguing that all our laws are
gendered male so gendered language should be used to discuss any law, including
using paternalism to describe laws aiming to protect people of all genders by
restricting their choices. Or a writer could justify using the gendered word
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paternalism by arguing (after citing sufficient empirical data) that
protect-by-restricting-choice parenting is gendered male, so analogous
protect-by-restricting-choice laws and policies are also gendered male. Absent one
of those two plausible arguments justifying use of the gendered word paternalism,
laws or policies aiming to protect people of all genders by restricting their choices
are better described as examples of parentalism.
In short, a presumption for using the gender-neutral word parentalism to
describe laws or policies aiming to protect people of all genders by restricting their
choices is well-grounded in the strong and widely-accepted reasons for ordinarily
using gender-neutral language. And examining legal scholarship’s many uses of
paternalism and parentalism illuminates our understandings of gender in both law
and parenting.
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Paternalism or Gender-Neutrality?
STEPHEN J. WARE *
INTRODUCTION
Paternalism’s relation to gender memorably impressed me as a law
student listening to my classmate respond to our Contracts professor’s
question. As my classmate argued for a broad unconscionability doctrine to
protect vulnerable parties from potentially harsh contract terms, she
characterized her own argument as “paternalist” and then, mid-thought,
stopped herself and said something like “I guess coming from me it would
actually be a ‘maternalist’ argument.” She made what many lawyers would
call a paternalist argument, but evidently thought that since she was making
the argument it was perhaps better characterized as maternalist.
Perhaps inspired by that law school classmate, and definitely guided by
a presumption in favor of gender-neutral language, a 1998 law review article
of mine used the word parentalist where many others would have used
paternalist—as a description of “laws that take discretion away from the
consumer” to protect the consumer.1 This use of the gender-neutral
parentalist where others would have used the gendered paternalist was
unusual, but not unprecedented, in legal scholarship. For instance, Ian Ayers
and Robert Gertner had previously referred to “parentalism” as the
justification for rules “displac[ing] freedom of contract . . . [to] protect []
parties within the contract.”2 And Marcy Strauss had written that
*
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Thanks to Elizabeth Kronk
Warner, Kyle Velte, Melanie DeRousse, Franciska Coleman, Lua Yuille, Chris Drahozal, Nancy Darling,
Susan McHale, Jennifer Lansford, David Lancy, Lenore Skenazy, and participants at a Widener
University Commonwealth Law School faculty workshop for comments. Thanks also to Bridget Brazil,
Matthew Frederick, Munzer Islam, Nick Slovikoski, Ariel Rhines, Alisha Peters, Amanda Feriante,
Justin Worthington, and Brandi Spates for research assistance.
1
Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist
Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 214 n.97 (1998) (“Who is to say what
information a consumer should acquire before making a decision? Contract law leaves that up to the
consumer who can decide how much time and money to invest in the acquisition of information.
Mandatory disclosure laws take that discretion away from the consumer. Far from fostering autonomy,
mandatory disclosure laws are ‘parentalist’ restrictions on autonomy.”).
2
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989) (“Put most simply, immutable rules are justifiable if society
wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties outside the contract. The former justification
turns on parentalism; the latter on externalities. Immutable rules displace freedom of contract.
Immutability is justified only if unregulated contracting would be socially deleterious because parties
internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves.”). See also Rob Atkinson,
Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 523 n.73 (1990) (“I say ‘parentalism’ rather
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“[p]arentalism is roughly defined as ‘interference with a person’s liberty of
action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good,
happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced.’”3
Professor Strauss added that “[t]he term paternalism is sex-linked; it is
drawn from the role of the father in the family. Parentalism reflects, in a
more egalitarian fashion, the same principles.”4
In that egalitarian spirit, a 2017 article of mine used parentalist similarly
in a draft.5 However, the very capable Harvard Law School student editors
objected: “If [‘parentalist’] is going to be in here, it absolutely needs some
explanation of why a ‘gender-neutral’ form of paternalist is necessary here,
because ‘paternalist’ is gendered for a reason . . . .”6 When asked for that
reason, the editors wrote: “Paternalism is often used because it stems from
male dominance and how men treat people, and thus carries a negative
connotation.”7
This 2017 view that negative connotations associated with male
dominance warrant continued use of the gendered word paternalism perhaps
contrasts with the view—expressed by Marcy Strauss in 1987—that using
the gender-neutral parentalism, instead of paternalism, was laudably
“egalitarian.”8 And this contrast may reflect broader generational differences
across the thirty years from 1987 to 2017. On the other hand, this Article
than ‘paternalism’ in part to avoid the latter term’s connotations of officious intermeddling, but primarily
to use a gender-neutral synonym. At least in my own experience, concern for another’s welfare combined
with a claim of superior insight into the other’s needs can come from a parent of either sex.”).
3
Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for
Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 321 (1987) (“The main justification offered for attorney decisionmaking
is based on parentalistic assumptions. Parentalism is roughly defined as ‘interference with a person’s
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests
or values of the person being coerced.’ Thus, the attorney, as parentalist, ‘claims to act on the (client’s)
behalf, but not at that person’s behest; indeed, the “beneficiary” of paternalist action may even explicitly
repudiate those actions on his behalf.’ Parentalism in the legal profession is based on a belief that
nonattorneys are inherently incapable of making informed judgments, and thus need a professional to
decide what legal alternatives are best for them. The attorney may even override the client’s wishes for
what the attorney believes is in the client’s benefit.”).
4
Id. at 321 n.34; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 963, 987 (1986–87) (“[C]ondemnation of paternalism (parentalism) in modern writing on ethics
in the professions is the product of the lonely-individual doctrine in philosophical ethics, and of the
philosophical distinction between fact and value, particularly in its disposition to turn the parental
metaphor into a moral principle.”).
5
Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, 23 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 113–14 (2017) (“[E]ven consumers who have no complaint with their treatment by
a business may have been harmed by the business’s violations of law, but not realize it. So discovering
and deterring such violations is an important role for the plaintiffs’ lawyers who bring class actions, and
enforcing class waivers hurts consumers who do not realize they would benefit from a class action. Jean
Sternlight, for example, opposes enforcement of arbitral class waivers in part on this paternalist (or
‘parentalist’) ground.”); see also id. at 114 n.280 (“I prefer ‘parentalist’ to ‘paternalist,’ . . . , but that
gender neutrality does not seem to have caught on.”).
6
On file with Author.
7
On file with Author.
8
Strauss, supra note 3, at 321 n.34.
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argues that each view—for and against using the gendered word
paternalism—is strong within its field. Specifically, this Article’s thesis is
that legal scholars should use the gendered word paternalism when they
want to emphasize the relevance of gender—including, perhaps especially,
male dominance—or otherwise convey a gendered meaning, but they should
use the gender-neutral parentalism when they do not articulate any
important relevance to gender, as they often do not in scholarship on contract
and related areas of law.
This Article’s argument about when to use each word—paternalism or
parentalism—is both supported by widely-established good practices and
illuminatingly novel. This argument for using the gender-neutral word
parentalism is supported by widely-established good practices because it is
well-grounded in the strong and widely-accepted reasons for ordinarily
using gender-neutral language. To its credit, legal scholarship has over the
last several decades largely adopted gender-neutral language, except when
writers want to convey a gendered meaning. At one level, this Article’s
argument is a fairly straightforward application of the prevailing view that
gendered words tend to convey gendered meanings. So, we lawyers should
use a gendered word (here, paternalism) when we intend a gendered
meaning, but should otherwise use gender-neutral language (here,
parentalism).
While that is a fairly straightforward argument for consistency—for
using paternalism and parentalism consistently with our other choices
between gendered and gender-neutral language—it is also an illuminating
argument. It illuminates our understandings of gender in both law and
parenting. For example, as a parent of an energetically impulsive toddler, I
frequently restricted my child’s choices because I cared for him and was
trying to protect him. While I often allowed him to choose which direction
to walk on the grass or sidewalk, I did not allow his choice to run into the
street before checking for oncoming cars. He made this dangerous choice
several times, and each time I grabbed him by the arm to prevent him from
running into the street. Was my restriction of his choice paternalist because
I was his father and acting typically of fathers? Or was my restriction of his
choice parentalist because I was his parent and acting typically of parents?
I believe the latter because I believe nearly all parents of any gender would
restrict their toddlers much as I restricted mine. Restricting another person’s
choice as a way to protect that person is part of parenting, not just part of
fathering, or just part of mothering.9 But gender differences in such
9
The amount and contexts of such protect-by-restricting-choice parenting varies within and across
societies and time periods, as, for example, parents restricting children’s “screen time” changes with
technology. See, e.g., Anya Kamenetz, A Guide to Parental Controls for Kids’ Tech Use, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (June 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/18/620005246/a-guide-to-parentalcontrols-for-kids-tech-use (“Ben Zimmerman lives in a suburb of Chicago. Like a lot of 9-year-olds, he’s
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parenting may be relevant, so this Article addresses the possibility that
empirical studies of such differences show that restricting children to protect
them is gendered—that is, more common among fathers than mothers, or
vice versa.10
Distinct from parents (and others) trying to protect children by
restricting children’s choices is the phenomenon of men restricting women’s
choices. When that is the sense in which a writer uses paternalism, the
gendered word fits because the writer conveys a gendered meaning and
emphasizes gender’s important relevance. Accordingly, many contemporary
legal scholars use paternalism in an expressly gendered way, such as by
defining it as an “ideology [that] teaches men to minimize women’s
agency,”11 or using it more broadly to refer to an attitude especially
characteristic of men or an attitude directed primarily toward women.12
These writers appropriately use a gendered word when making statements
emphasizing gender’s important relevance.
In contrast, many legal scholars continue to use the gendered word
paternalism without any apparent intent to convey a gendered meaning.
Legal scholars do this when discussing laws or policies aiming to protect
people (of all genders) by restricting their choices. While gender may be
relevant to any legal issue, much legal scholarship does not emphasize or
even mention any relevance to gender. For instance, without mentioning
gender, several scholars—including leaders in the economic analysis of
law—say the “standard justifications for mandatory restrictions on freedom
of contract are to protect people inside (paternalism) or outside
(externalities) the contract.”13 And without mentioning gender, many legal
scholars cite paternalism as a standard justification for restrictions on
contractual choice, such as the unconscionability doctrine, usury laws, the
minimum wage, and countless regulations limiting the range of enforceable
fond of YouTube, Roblox, and Minecraft. And, like a lot of parents, his mom and dad wanted to make
sure Ben wasn’t spending too much time on those activities. They tried to use Google’s ‘Family Link’
parental control software to limit screen time.”). While in the contemporary United States, toddlers often
receive environments “designed for their safety and parents are explicitly warned to ensure that activities
like climbing stairs are closely supervised,” in traditional cultures, “good parents . . . let children do what
we would see as patently dangerous things,” such as “playing with machetes, running barefoot through
fires, and dragging around sharp pieces of rusty metal.” Such “parenting is guided by strongly held
beliefs” like “[i]njury is a learning opportunity.” Nancy Darling, Where Toddlers Play with Knives:
TODAY
(Sept.
30,
2018),
Parenting
World
Views,
PSYCHOL.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/thinking-about-kids/201809/where-toddlers-play-knivesparenting-world-views; see also David F. Lancy, Playing with Knives: The Socialization of Self-Initiated
Learners, 87 CHILD DEV. 654, 655 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12498 (discussing the tolerance
of children engaging in risky behavior as a form of socialization in certain cultures).
10
See infra Section III.D.3.
11
Courtney Fraser, From “Ladies First” to “Asking for It”: Benevolent Sexism in the Maintenance
of Rape Culture, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 165 (2015).
12
See infra Section II.
13
See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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promises by consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and others.14
Scholars in contract and related areas of law often use a non-gendered
definition of paternalism under which “a policy counts as paternalistic if it
is justified on the belief that it will make a person better off than if the person
had been left to choose between the available options for him or herself.”15
Such policies—restricting the choices of a “person” as likely to be a “him”
as a “her”—are, this Article contends, better described as parentalist, unless
the writer indicates any important relevance of gender and thus manifests
the writer’s intent to convey a gendered meaning.
This Article’s first section summarizes the strong and widely accepted
reasons for ordinarily using gender-neutral language, except when seeking
to convey a gendered meaning, as in the common practice of using gendered
words like mother and woman when discussing pregnancy. Section I
concludes that legal scholarship’s general presumption in favor of
gender-neutral language, but gendered language when emphasizing gender
to convey a gendered meaning, should be applied to paternalism, so we
generally should use that gendered word when conveying a gendered
meaning but should otherwise use the gender-neutral parentalism.
Accordingly, Section II quotes and praises legal scholars’ gendered uses of
paternalism—such as defining it in an expressly-gendered way or using it to
describe an attitude especially characteristic of men or directed primarily
toward women.
In contrast, Section III quotes and criticizes legal scholars’
non-gendered uses of the word paternalism, such as citing “paternalism” as
a standard justification for restrictions on contractual choice, including the
unconscionability doctrine, usury laws, the minimum wage, and countless
regulations limiting the range of enforceable promises by consumers,
borrowers, employees, investors, and others. When law aims to protect
vulnerable people by restricting their choices to form potentially harsh
contracts, Section III contends, the reasons for ordinarily using
gender-neutral language counsel for describing such law as parentalist
rather than paternalist, unless the writer emphasizes the relevance of gender
or otherwise manifests an intent to convey a gendered meaning. When a
legal scholar wants to write in a gender-neutral way about law limiting
freedom of contract to protect contracting parties of all genders, the rationale
for those limits is presumptively better described with the gender-neutral
word parentalism than the gendered word paternalism. However, Section
III concludes by addressing several plausible arguments for using
paternalism to describe such laws: (A) all laws are gendered male; (B)
restricting people’s choices (even to protect those people) is gendered male;
and (C) paternalism’s negative connotations attach to men.
14
15

See infra notes 100–04 and accompanying text.
Jacob Goldin, Libertarian Quasi-Paternalism, 82 MO. L. REV. 669, 669 (2017).
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Section IV quotes and praises many legal scholars already doing what
this Article advocates—using parentalism rather than paternalism to
describe laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their
choices. Section IV acknowledges that other legal scholars use the word
parentalist, in a very different context, to describe views about the primacy
of parents (as opposed to government) in raising children. But Section IV
concludes that these separate strands of legal scholarship using the word
parentalist differently rarely produce confusion because context quickly
clarifies any ambiguity. So, the case for parentalist as the gender-neutral
replacement for paternalist is not significantly weakened by a separate use
of parentalist with a different meaning.
The Conclusion reiterates this Article’s thesis that we should use the
gendered word paternalism when emphasizing the important relevance of
gender or otherwise manifesting an intent to convey a gendered meaning,
but should otherwise use the gender-neutral parentalism. In particular, we
should use the gender-neutral word parentalism to describe
protect-by-restricting-choice laws, unless emphasizing the relevance of
gender or otherwise manifesting an intent to convey a gendered meaning.
The Conclusion reviews two plausible examples of a gendered meaning.
One is that a writer could justify using the gendered word paternalism by
arguing that all our laws are gendered male so gendered language should be
used to discuss any law, including using paternalism to describe laws aiming
to protect people of all genders by restricting their choices. Or a writer could
justify using the gendered word paternalism by arguing (after citing
sufficient empirical data) that protect-by-restricting-choice parenting is
gendered male, so analogous protect-by-restricting-choice laws and policies
are also gendered male. Absent one of those two plausible arguments
justifying use of the gendered word paternalism, this Article concludes, laws
or policies aiming to protect people of all genders by restricting their choices
are better described as examples of parentalism.
I. THE CASE FOR GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE, EXCEPT WHEN
CONVEYING A GENDERED MEANING
Language matters. The words we use, and the meanings we attach to
those words, reflect our thoughts, but they also influence our thoughts and
thus our behavior. This power of words to influence is central to scholars of
linguistics and rhetoric,16 as well as to practitioners of rhetoric, like lawyers.
16
John A. Lucy, Linguistic Relativity, 26 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 291, 292 (1997) (describing
the ways within the field of linguistics that language is believed to influence thought); Terrill Pollman,
Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV.
887, 900 (2002) (stating that “[t]he modern rhetorical view [is] that language is constitutive of thought”);
M. Kienpointer, Whorf and Wittgenstein. Language, World View and Augmentation, 10
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As one scientist puts it, “changing how people talk changes how they
think.”17 Similarly, a mainstream textbook on legal writing says, “Language
does not only reflect reality; it also influences our perceptions of reality.
Language, therefore, may be a guiding force to effect changes in reality—in
fact, language shapes reality.”18 That legal writing textbook—Legal Writing
Style, by Antonio Gidi and Henry Weihofen—did not include that statement
in its 1961 first edition. However, by its 1980 second edition, Legal Writing
Style included part of that statement in the following passage:
Avoid Sexist Expressions (When You Can)
Does the use of the masculine gender to include the feminine
invidiously imply male superiority? Some of us have become
convinced that is does. Language does not only reflect reality;
it also influences our perceptions of reality. Experiments have
shown that generic statements of “man” evoke, to a
statistically significant degree, images of males only, whereas
corresponding statements that avoid using the word “man”
evoke images of both males and females.19
This contrast between gendered language and gender-neutral language
is a paradigmatic example of words’ power to influence. And movement
toward gender-neutral language is exemplified by the three editions of Legal
Writing Style. The 1961 edition used gendered and even “sexist language,”20
with phrases like:
•

“The lawyer must be more precise in his writing than
almost anyone else”;21

ARGUMENTATION 475, 492 (1996) (referring to “the strong influence of language on thought and world
view”).
17
Lera Boroditsky, How Language Shapes Thought, 304 SCI. AM. 62, 65 (2011) (referring to
“demonstrations establishing that language indeed plays a causal role in shaping cognition. Studies have
shown that changing how people talk changes how they think. Teaching people new color words, for
instance, changes their ability to discriminate colors. And teaching people a new way of talking about
time gives them a new way of thinking about it”).
18
ANTONIO GIDI & HENRY WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE 23 (3d ed. 2018). See also Lucinda
M. Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 887 (1989) (“Language . . . reflects the world views and chosen meanings
of those who have had power to affect definitions and create terms. The selected terms and meanings
then shape our understandings of what things are, of the way the world is.”).
19
HENRY WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE 19 (2d ed. 1980).
20
Greg Johnson, Welcome to Our Gender-Neutral Future, 42 VT. B.J. 36, 37 (2016) (“Henry
Weihofen also says nothing about omitting sexist language in the first edition of his influential Legal
Writing Style in 1961. Worse, when recommending varying word choice for the same term to ‘avoid
ambiguity or excessive repetition,’ Weihofen argues that ‘the substitute should be only a substitute, and
not an elegant sobriquet, such as “the weaker sex” for women, “Old Glory” for the flag, or “the staff of
life” for bread.’ What is elegant about the sobriquet ‘the weaker sex’?!”).
21
HENRY WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE 7 (1st ed. 1961).
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•

“A letter to a businessman has a different audience
from one addressed to a workman with an eighth grade
education”;22 and

•

“Some of a lawyer’s most important writings—briefs,
for example—are written for busy men.”23

In contrast, the 1980 second edition of Legal Writing Style includes the
above exhortation to “Avoid Sexist Expressions (When You Can)” as part
of a page and a half lesson on the topic. Going much further, the 2018 third
edition of Legal Writing Style expands this lesson to eleven pages under the
more absolute exhortation to “Use Gender-Neutral Language.”24
This legal writing textbook’s evolution toward gender-neutral language
paralleled a similar move toward gender-neutral language throughout our
society during the latter part of the twentieth century.
As professionals in various fields began to adopt it,
gender-neutral language appeared in employment advertising,
textbooks, popular media, dictionaries, and religious
publications. Studies reported a decline in the use of masculine
nouns and pronouns as generics, with one study finding a
notable decline in their use in American newspapers and
magazines between 1971 and 1979.25
Examples of this move toward gender-neutral language include “chairman,”
“mailman,” and “fireman” changing to the gender-neutral terms “chair,”
“letter carrier,” and “firefighter,” while “male-female pairs like
waiter-waitress and steward-stewardess” changed to “server” and “flight
attendant.”26
The move toward gender-neutral language very much includes the legal
profession. As Judith Fischer recounts,
[I]n the 1980s, a wave of gender task-force studies . . .
examined various aspects of women and the law . . . . Some of
the published reports proposed the use of gender-neutral
language in statutes, judicial opinions, and other legal writing.
22

Id. at 5.
Id. at 37.
24
GIDI & WEIHOFEN, supra note 18, at 22–34.
25
Judith D. Fischer, Framing Gender: Federal Appellate Judges’ Choices About Gender-Neutral
Language, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 480–81 (2009).
26
David Ludden, Talking Like It’s 1984, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 23, 2015),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/talking-apes/201503/talking-it-s-1984; see also Johnson,
supra note 20, at 37 (“The drive to omit sexist language went mainstream in the 1980s and 1990s. We
now say layperson instead of layman, business executive instead of businessman, reporter instead of
newsman, worker’s compensation instead of workman’s compensation, and firefighter instead of
fireman. Common idioms and figures of speech like ‘old wives’ tales’ are now considered sexist.”).
23
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Some states adopted gender-neutral language in their
constitutions, statutes, or other legal discourse, and sections on
gender-neutral language began to appear in legal writing
textbooks.27
Fischer says, “these changes were based first of all on principles of
fairness.”28 Gender-biased language “relegates girls and women to
‘secondary status,’” and thus “not only reflects but also helps to construct
and perpetuate a sexist reality.”29 “For example, feminist scholars have long
decried that masculine generics are androcentric, and make women seem
invisible . . . .”30 In contrast, gender-neutral language can “help construct a
frame of the legal system that includes and empowers both genders.”31 In
short, fairly including women—rather than relegating them to a less visible,
secondary status below men—is a strong reason for gender-neutral
language, and this reasoning has largely prevailed in the legal profession.
An additional reason for gender-neutral language is to include people whose
gender identity is nonbinary.32
Nevertheless, legal scholars sensibly continue to use gendered language
to convey a gendered meaning when emphasizing the important relevance
of gender. For instance, legal scholars often continue to use gendered
27

Fischer, supra note 25, at 486.
Id.
29
Judith D. Fischer, The Supreme Court and Gender-Neutral Language: Splitting La Difference,
33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 218, 221–22 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30
Jennifer L. Prewitt-Freilino et al., The Gendering of Language: A Comparison of Gender Equality
in Countries with Gendered, Natural Gender, and Genderless Languages, 66 SEX ROLES 268, 270 (2011)
(referring to “the power that asymmetries in lexical gender . . . can have on social gender stereotypes and
inequities in status between men and women”).
31
Fischer, supra note 25, at 487. See also Pat K. Chew & Lauren K. Kelley-Chew, Subtly Sexist
Language, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 643, 643–44 (2007) (“Language can be a potent vehicle for subtle
sexism. As lawyers, we understand the power of words. What we say and how we say it can perpetuate
gender stereotypes and status differences between women and men. In contrast, language also can be
used as a constructive tool for reinforcing equality.”); Michela Menegatti & Monica Rubini, Gender Bias
and Sexism in Language, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA COMM. (Sept. 2017),
https://oxfordre.com/communication/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore9780190228613-e-470?print=pdf (“In order to reduce gender bias, it is necessary to change people’s
linguistic habits by making them aware of the beneficial effects of gender-fair expressions.”).
32
See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 896 (2019) (“With
stunning speed, nonbinary gender identities have gone from obscurity to prominence in American public
life. The use of gender-neutral pronouns such as ‘they, them, and theirs’ to describe an individual person
is growing in acceptance.” [People with nonbinary gender identities do not exclusively identify as men
or women.]); Statement on Gender and Language, NAT’L COUNCIL TEACHERS ENG. (Oct. 25, 2018),
http://www2.ncte.org/statement/genderfairuseoflang/ (“The most common concepts of gender are based
on the long-perpetuated notion that gender is a binary matter, and that it always aligns with a binary
designation of sex (male/female). Yet contemporary understandings of gender clarify that gender identity
and expression occur along a broad spectrum that is not limited to two binary alternatives, such as
woman/man or girl/boy. . . . The ‘Statement on Gender and Language’ (2018) . . . recommends usage
that moves beyond the gender binary in order to include individuals whose identities might otherwise be
unacknowledged or devalued.”).
28
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language (such as “her,” “she,” “mother,” and “woman”) when discussing
topics such as pregnancy,33 abortion,34 breastfeeding,35 and menstruation.36
In sum, prevailing in our profession is a general presumption in favor of
gender-neutral language, but use of gendered language when conveying a
gendered meaning by emphasizing gender’s important relevance. This
preference for gender-neutral language in general, but use of gendered
language to convey a gendered meaning, is good and should be applied to
the word paternalism and its gender-neutral counterpart, parentalism. That
is, legal scholars generally37 should use the gendered word paternalism
when they want to convey a gendered meaning by emphasizing the
33
Dara E. Purvis, The Rules of Maternity, 84 TENN. L. REV. 367, 371 (2017) (“Once a child is born,
the mother’s choices such as the food she eats no longer impact her child in the same way, yet social
expectations regarding mothers as primary caregivers extend the heightened surveillance of her behavior
as a parent.”); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against
Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 190 (2004) (“Pregnancy, like the high-pitched female voice, has no
identical cross-sex parallel. . . . Because a pregnant woman could never show that she was being treated
worse than a man with precisely the same trait, she could never show that adverse employment actions
related to her pregnancy discriminated against her on the basis of sex.”); see also Rona Kaufman Kitchen,
Holistic Pregnancy: Rejecting the Theory of the Adversarial Mother, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 207,
208 (2015) (“Rather than presuming the pregnant woman will act in the best interests of her pregnancy
and of fetal life, the law assumes that she is hostile to her unborn child and identifies the State as better
suited to protect pregnancy and fetal life.”); Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing Pregnancy, 92 IND. L.J.
947, 965 (2017) (“A woman can be convicted of this crime if she ‘knowingly ingests, injects, consumes,
inhales, or otherwise uses a narcotic drug or controlled substance without a prescription’ while she is
pregnant or ‘knows or reasonably should have known’ she was pregnant.”).
34
Jared H. Jones, Annotation, Women’s Reproductive Rights Concerning Abortion, and
Governmental Regulation Thereof—Supreme Court Cases, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 8 (2007) (“[W]hen a minor
becomes pregnant and considers an abortion, the relevant circumstances may vary widely depending
upon her age, maturity, mental and physical condition, the stability of her home if she is not emancipated,
and her relationship with her parents.”); Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity, Spatial
Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 76, 92 (2015)
(“A rural woman may find it impossible to get an abortion if she must travel many hours to reach
an abortion provider, especially if she has few transportation options, little money, or is otherwise
constrained.”); Morgan Arnett, Comment, Update: Phasing Out Abortion: One Step Closer to
Terminating a Woman’s Constitutional Right, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 597, 609
(2007) (“Pro-choice supporters also believe that every child born into the world should be wanted:
allowing abortions would reduce child abuse and neglect, so if a woman does not want to continue the
pregnancy, she has options.”).
35
Heather M. Kolinsky, Respecting Working Mothers with Infant Children: The Need for Increased
Federal Intervention to Develop, Protect, and Support a Breastfeeding Culture in the United States, 17
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 333, 334 (2010) (“Legislation in nearly every state seeks to protect a
woman’s right to breastfeed her child in any public place where she has a right to be.”).
36
Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, 2017
WIS. L. REV. 491, 516 (“A woman’s right to be free from discrimination is violated when menstrual
hygiene products are subject to sales tax when there are no similar products that men must use because
of an involuntary, biological monthly occurrence, and when the closest analogous products used
primarily by men are not subject to taxation. Taxing products used primarily, or even exclusively, by
women is to tax them on the basis of their sex, something which is prohibited by international human
rights norms.”).
37
For counterarguments potentially justifying exceptions to this generalization, see infra Section
III.D.
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important relevance of gender, but otherwise should use the gender-neutral
parentalism.
II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP’S GENDERED USES OF THE WORD PATERNALISM
A. Gendered Definitions of Paternalism
It is fitting that legal scholars use the gendered word “paternalism” when
apparently intending to convey a gendered meaning. Paternalism came into
the English language as a gendered word—from the Latin word for father,
“pater.”38 Paternalism literally means “to act like a father or treat another as
a child.”39
With its roots in the notion of fatherhood and acting like a
father, “paternalism” means making decisions on others’
behalf to protect them from harm or to advance their
well-being. Although the motivation for paternalistic
intervention may be altruistic, it inevitably involves an
element of autonomy-deprivation for the “protected” party.40
Paternalism’s etymology
reflects the implicit social hierarchies of patriarchal cultures,
in which fathers or male heads of families were understood to
be authority figures responsible for the welfare of subordinates
and dependents. In this tradition, adult members of states,
corporations, and communities functioned under the
presumably benevolent authority of kings, presidents, and
executives.41
Questioning this presumption of benevolence in kings, Locke cautioned
against confounding “paternal” and “political” power; and Kant similarly
warned that “the worst conceivable despotism” would be government
“founded on the principle of benevolence toward the people, as a father’s
toward his children—in other words, . . . paternalistic government
(imperium paternale).”42
38
2 PETER SUBER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 632 (Christopher Berry Gray ed.,
1st ed. 1999); Lindsay J. Thompson, Paternalism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 23, 2013),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/paternalism.
39
2 SUBER, supra note 38, at 632.
40
Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and
Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 889.
41
Thompson, supra note 38; see also Edward A. Fallone, Charters, Compacts, and Tea Parties:
The Decline and Resurrection of a Delegation View of the Constitution, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1067,
1091 (2010) (referring to “[t]raditional notions of sovereignty that had long viewed the king as a
paternalistic father figure”).
42
IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT WON’T WORK IN
PRACTICE 58–59 (E.B. Ashton trans., 1974) (1793) (emphasis omitted); Thaddeus Mason Pope,
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Consistent with the gendered origin and history of the word paternalism,
many contemporary legal scholars continue to define the word in an
expressly gendered way. For instance, law review articles over the last
fifteen years have defined paternalism as “the institutionalization of male
dominance,”43 or an “ideology [that] teaches men to minimize women’s
agency.”44 Similarly using paternalistic to describe policies reinforcing male
dominance or privilege, one law review article refers to “paternalistic
sentiments in which men are deemed rulers of their households,”45 and other
articles say:
•

“The
paternalistic
mechanisms
supporting
colonialism and empire abroad transferred as a model
to the paternalistic family at home, serving to both
create and reinforce it. This privileging of the
dominant group over others . . . constituted white male
authority over both family and community”;46

•

“This regime of guardianship is completely
paternalistic, favoring males and neglecting females
entirely”;47 and

•

“[D]eferential review of gender classifications
mirrored the paternalistic views of a male-dominated
society.”48

These articles quite sensibly use a gendered word—paternalism or
paternalistic—to convey a gendered meaning, that is, a meaning about male
Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
659, 681–83 (2004) (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 2D TREATISE §§ 52–53, at
170 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1698)).
43
Stephen Paul Kennedy, Sex, Power, and the Claims of Virtue Reflection on the Indefensibility of
Sexual Harassment, 14 TRINITY L. REV. 29, 59 (2007) (describing “paternalism” as “the
institutionalization of male dominance”). See also Gila Stopler, “A Rank Usurpation of Power”–The
Role of Patriarchal Religion and Culture in the Subordination of Women, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 365, 380 (2008) (“Dominance is disguised as benevolence, and sexism—the ideology of male
supremacy and superiority over women—serves as the ‘factual’ basis that explains to women why they
need this form of paternalism while simultaneously allowing men to convince themselves that they are
only acting in everyone’s, especially women’s, best interests.”).
44
Fraser, supra note 11, at 165 (“[P]aternalistic ideology teaches men to minimize women’s agency
. . . .”).
45
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 U. CIN. L. REV.
207, 261 (2010).
46
See Deborah Anthony, Analyzing the Disappearance of Women’s Surnames and the
Retrenchment of their Political-Legal Status in Early Modern England, 29 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 7,
23 (2018).
47
Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL’Y 1, 68–69 (2006).
48
Donald E. Lively & Ellen S. Podgor, Reckoning with the Bluster of Apolitical Jurisprudence, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715, 718–19 (1992).
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dominance or privilege. And these articles may not all presume men’s
benevolence toward women—that men consistently try to use their
dominance or privilege for women’s good49—any more than Locke and Kant
presumed royal benevolence toward subject people—that kings consistently
try to use their dominance or privilege for the good of their subjects.
B. Paternalism as Attitude Especially Characteristic of Men
Also consistent with the gendered origin and history of the word
paternalism, legal scholars often continue to use the gendered words
paternalism and paternalistic to refer to an attitude especially characteristic
of men. For instance, one article in a legal journal refers to “the way
well-meaning white men might paternalistically treat women and
minorities,”50 and others say:
•

“Paternalism in medical practice was practiced by
male physicians on male and female patients alike”;51

•

Sex discrimination “likely reflected a paternalistic
view, promoted by men, that the legal state of affairs
benefitted both sexes”;52 and

•

“[E]lective share laws are terribly demeaning and
paternalistic to women. Male-dominated legislatures,
though, continue to perpetuate belittling female
stereotypes by saying through elective share laws that
women are so incompetent and unable to stand up for
themselves that the ‘little missies’ still must be
protected by some ancient magical sword.”53

49
See Jessica Knouse, Mandatory Ultrasounds and the Precession of Simulacra, 54 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 117, 139 (2017) (“[Women] are subordinated by the inherent paternalism [of mandatory
ultrasounds]; they are manipulated by the compromised informed consent procedure and inherent pro-life
bias . . . .”); Catherine London, Note, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy
Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 405 (2012) (referring to an “attempt by the paternalistic,
male-dominated medical establishment to exploit women’s reproductive capabilities to serve its own
interests”); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2087 (2003) (“[M]ale bosses
reinforce paternalistic authority by harassing or belittling women in traditionally female fields who dared
to step out of their proper place.”).
50
Melissa Mortazavi, The Cost of Avoidance: Pluralism, Neutrality, and the Foundations of
Modern Legal Ethics, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 151, 187 (2014).
51
Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing the Hippocratic Oath, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
77, 130 (1993).
52
Charles R. Calleros, Advocacy for Marriage Equality: The Power of a Broad Historical Narrative
During a Transitional Period in Civil Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1249, 1297.
53
Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to Whomever I Choose
at My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737,
793 (2006).
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In each of these uses of the word paternalism, the paternalists are
exclusively or mostly men, so a gendered word fits. These scholars sensibly
use a gendered word, paternalism, to convey gendered meanings.
C. Women as Especially Likely Objects of Paternalism
The previous section praises use of the gendered word paternalism to
refer to an attitude especially characteristic of men. Also praiseworthy is the
use of this gendered word when the writer emphasizes women as especially
likely objects of this “paternalistic” attitude. Such articles are numerous.
Several of them address pregnancy:
•

“[P]regnancy, like traditional disabilities, has often
led to paternalistic policies excluding pregnant
women from paid work and other aspects of public
life”;54

•

“[F]eminists have . . . challenge[d] the idea, steeped in
paternalism, that pregnant women need to be treated
as if infirm or in need of protection”;55

•

“[F]eminists were able to document and bring voice to
workplace paternalism that had systematically
excluded and punished pregnant women”;56

•

“Imposing more stringent regulations on pregnant
women is based on paternalistic notions that value the
protection of the fetus over the pregnant woman’s
health, autonomy, and well-being”;57

•

“[T]he pending Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,
which
would
secure
an
asymmetric,
pregnancy-specific
right
to
workplace
accommodations” “may revitalize exclusionary and
paternalistic attitudes toward pregnant employees,
signal an incapacity to work, and increase sex
discrimination”;58

54
Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53
B.C. L. REV. 443, 476 (2012).
55
Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, Law, and Culture, 65 STAN. L. REV.
457, 508 (2013).
56
Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis of the
ADA’s Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 17 (2012).
57
Greer Donley, Encouraging Maternal Sacrifice: How Regulations Governing the Consumption
of Pharmaceuticals During Pregnancy Prioritize Fetal Safety over Maternal Health and Autonomy, 39
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 48 (2015).
58
Bradley A. Areheart, The Symmetry Principle, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1085, 1114–15 (2017).
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•

“[F]eminists’ concerns that permitting healthy
pregnant workers to argue they have ADA disabilities
would revive exclusionary and paternalistic attitudes
toward pregnancy”;59 and

•

“To argue that surrogates, who willingly enter a
contract, can no longer be held to their good faith
agreement because of the intervening distress of
pregnancy, reinforces a sense of paternalism—
minimizing women’s decision-making capabilities
due to supposed hormonally-induced unpredictability.
Surrogacy contracts should be held to the same
requirements under the law as all other contractual
agreements.”60

555

Pregnancy is not the only context in which writers sensibly use the
gendered word paternalism in emphasizing women as especially likely
objects of a “paternalistic” attitude. Other such contexts appear in the
following examples:
•

“[R]equiring only girls and young women to be
vaccinated against HPV . . . discriminates against
women because it assumes that they, unlike men, need
protection and paternalism”;61

•

“Opponents to the requirement of women registering
[for the draft] espoused paternalistic views on women
not serving in combat”;62

•

“Judicial paternalism posits that judges (as well as
other court officials such as prosecutors and probation
officers) view females as weak and in need of
protection from the harsh environments of jails and
prisons”;63

•

“Although paternalism has occasioned favorable
outcomes for individual women in the criminal justice

59

Cox, supra note 54, at 473.
Julia Dalzell, The Enforcement of Selective Reduction Clauses in Surrogacy Contracts, 27
WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 83, 122 (2018).
61
Linda C. Fentiman, Sex, Science, and the Age of Anxiety, 92 NEB. L. REV. 455, 503 (2014).
62
Renee Just, Note, GI Jane: A Comparison of the Legal Framework for Women’s Military Service
in Israel and the United States, 8 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 165, 176–77 (2017).
63
Mirko Bagaric & Brienna Bagaric, Mitigating the Crime That Is the Over-Imprisonment of
Women: Why Orange Should Not Be the New Black, 41 VT. L. REV. 537, 590 n.346 (2017) (quoting Ann
Martin Stacey & Cassia Spohn, Gender and the Social Costs of Sentencing: An Analysis of Sentences
Imposed on Male and Female Offenders in Three U.S. District Courts, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 43, 49–
51 (2006) (internal footnotes omitted)).
60
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system, it has been defined by feminists as ultimately
harmful, because the protection afforded women is
based on their presumed inferiority; women are,
therefore, less than fully adult, when ‘adult’ is
synonymous with ‘male.’ This paternalism spared
women’s lives, but it cannot be read uncritically as
leniency”;64
•

“[P]aternalistic views about women’s health cause the
FDA to either underestimate the morbidity treated by
a women’s health product or overestimate the risks
posed by the drug”;65

•

“The status of motherhood at present is to be
subordinated to paternalistic assessments of what is
best for children”;66

•

“[T]he paternalistic world in which these women
often feel trapped—a world that finds their sole value
in childbearing”;67

•

“Women summoned the state to challenge patriarchal
norms and power arrangements but then found
themselves subject to new forms of paternalism”;68

•

“As enforced, the persistence of the regulation of
prostitution may indeed owe to paternalistic state
denial of women’s ownership over their bodies”;69

•

“Paternalism reflects a lack of respect for autonomy
and for the individual as a person. A number of the
policies adopted to address domestic violence—
policies championed by many advocates for women
who have been battered—are guided by what seems to
be patently paternalistic views of these women as

64
Lynsey Black, “On the Other Hand the Accused Is A Woman . . .”: Women and the Death Penalty
in Post-Independence Ireland, 36 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 170 (2018) (footnotes omitted).
65
Mara Sanders, Note, Sex, Drugs, and Advisory Committees: An Analysis of Pharmaceutical
Industry Manipulation of FDA Vulnerability to Sociopolitical Influences on Matters of Women’s Health,
48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 166–67 (2017).
66
Dara E. Purvis, The Rules of Maternity, 84 TENN. L. REV. 367, 440 (2017).
67
Torrey McConnell, Note, The War on Women: The Collateral Consequences of Female
Incarceration, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2017).
68
Jennifer Carlson & Kristin A. Goss, Gendering the Second Amendment, 80 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 103, 120 (2017).
69
V. Noah Gimbel, Note, Fetal Tissue Research & Abortion: Conscription, Commodification, and
the Future of Choice, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 229, 278 (2017).
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powerless, limited individuals incapable of acting on
their own behalf”;70 and
•

“[Women] are subordinated by the inherent
paternalism [of mandatory ultrasounds]; they are
manipulated by the compromised informed consent
procedure and inherent pro-life bias . . . .”71

In all these uses of the word paternalism, the writers emphasize women
as the objects of paternalist attitudes or policies. So, these writers’ uses of
the gendered word paternalism are supported by the good reason that they
are conveying gendered meanings.
D. Paternalism as an Attitude Especially Characteristic of Men and
Directed Primarily Toward Women
The previous two sections quote and praise legal articles’ uses of the
gendered word paternalism when writers apparently intend to convey a
gendered meaning by emphasizing the important relevance of gender. This
Section quotes articles combining these gendered meanings, that is, using
paternalism to refer to an attitude especially characteristic of men and
directed primarily toward women.
For example, several articles use paternalism to describe the attitudes of
male judges, as compared to female judges, toward women convicted of
crimes. One such article refers to “[e]vidence of a paternalistic bias among
male judges that favors female offenders” with lighter sentences.72 Another
says, “theories of paternalism suggest leniency toward women arose out of
an implied power dynamic in which male court authorities perceived female
offenders as inferior to men both socially and legally.”73 A third notes,
“[t]here is evidence that, as judges, women tend to be . . . less
paternalistically forgiving than men to female offenders . . . .”74 A fourth
says: “[S]ome have called judicial paternalism . . . the less stringent
sentencing of female offenders by protective and paternalistic male judges .
. . .”75 In all these uses of the word paternalism, the paternalists are men and
70
Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions
in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
71
Knouse, supra note 49, at 139.
72
Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level
Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 57, 63, 75, 80, 89–90 (2005).
73
Amy Farrell, Geoff Ward & Danielle Rousseau, Intersections of Gender and Race in Federal
Sentencing: Examining Court Contexts and the Effects of Representative Court Authorities, 14 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 85, 88–89 (2010).
74
Ori Aronson, The Next Forty Presidents, 24 WM . & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 235, 241 (2018).
75
Haneefah A. Jackson, Note, When Love Is a Crime: Why the Drug Prosecutions and Punishments
of Female Non-Conspirators Cannot Be Justified by Retributive Principles, 46 HOW. L.J. 517, 540
(2003); see also Jody L. King, Avoiding Gender Bias in Downward Departures for Family
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the objects of their paternalism are women, in this case women convicted of
crimes. In short, these scholars fittingly use the gendered word paternalism
to convey gendered meanings with gender relevant to their points about
parties on each side of the paternalist relationship.
Criminal sentencing is just one of several fields in which legal articles
sensibly use the gendered word paternalism (or a variant like “paternalistic”)
to refer to an attitude especially characteristic of men towards women. Other
such articles refer to:
•

“[T]he paternalistic attitudes of male policy makers to
women’s human rights”;76

•

“[A] ‘paternalistic’ attitude of male judges toward
female plaintiffs in pregnancy discrimination cases”;77

•

An “attempt by the paternalistic, male-dominated
medical establishment to exploit women’s
reproductive capabilities to serve its own interests”;78

•

“[T]he paternalistic views of male physicians in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who declared
themselves experts in childbirth and introduced a
variety of interventions on the assumption that female
weakness required pain medication and other
interference with the body’s natural labor process”;79

•

“[T]raditional sexual paternalism, which dictates that
men and women have different virtues, and in many
realms, women need to be taken care of”;80

•

“[P]aternalistic views of the male duty to protect the
so-called weaker sex”;81

Responsibilities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273, 287 (“Prior to
the Guidelines, there was a wide-spread perception that women received preferential treatment in
sentencing decisions. Such preferential treatment was believed to be grounded in the chivalry or
paternalism of the predominantly male judiciary.” (footnotes omitted)).
76
Debdatta Dobe, Note, Resolution 2122: The “Aborted” Debate, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 175, 211
(2015).
77
John C. Coughenour et al., The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the
Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 887 (1994).
78
London, supra note 49, at 405; see also Eugene Morgulis, Note, Juror Reactions to Scientific
Testimony: Unique Challenges in Complex Mass Torts, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 252, 262 (2009)
(asserting that “[m]edicine is male-dominated and paternalistic toward women”).
79
Elizabeth Kukura, Obstetric Violence, 106 GEO. L.J. 721, 775–76 (2018).
80
Kelly Sarabyn, Racial and Sexual Paternalism, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 553, 564 (2009).
81
Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law
Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 33, 41 (2010); see also Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of
Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the Law, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 335, 345 (1992)
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•

“‘[M]en[,] accustomed to a paternalistic mode of
thinking about women,’ who found it difficult to
perceive how a special benefit to women actually
harmed them”;82

•

“[W]eaknesses
in
current
Supreme Court
jurisprudence . . . which revived paternalistic
ideologies associated with women’s capacity to
reason, consent, and make autonomous reproductive
healthcare decisions, because historically, the State
and courts have been complicit in undermining
women’s economic capacities and liberty interests”;83

•

“[Anti-polygamy] positions [that] bring together
philosophies familiar from both the right and left—
paternalistic guidance about what’s best for women,
and feminist articulations about the extent of women’s
power in a society with strong patriarchal roots”;84

•

“[A] form of gender paternalistic reasoning, which
like ‘the old gender paternalism’ is based on
‘stereotypes about women’s capacity and women’s
roles’ that serve to ‘deny women agency’ for the
ostensible purpose of protecting them from coercion
and/or freeing them to be mothers”;85

•

“[A] list of paternalistic qualifications that would
draw quick constitutional invalidation today:
‘Provided, however, That no female shall be given any
task, disproportionate to her strength, nor shall she be

559

(“Especially for men accustomed to a paternalistic mode of thinking about women, it is difficult to grasp
that a law which seems to give a special benefit to women actually harms her.”); Jessica L. Cornett, Note,
The U.S. Military Responds to Rape: Will Recent Changes Be Enough?, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 99,
115 (2008) (associating “[t]he pervasively male-dominated and paternalistic culture of the U.S. military”
with “[v]iews such as women in uniform are inferior, which are reinforced by restrictions placed on
women’s service opportunities”); Blake J. Furman, Note, Gender Equality in High School Sports: Why
There Is a Contact Sports Exemption to Title IX, Eliminating It, and a Proposal for the Future, 17
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1169, 1178 (2007) (“[T]he rationale that females need to
be protected from injury and male domination is overly paternalistic.”).
82
Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 U. HAW. L.
REV. 699, 728–29 (1998) (footnote omitted).
83
Michele Goodwin & Meigan Thompson, In the Shadow of the Court: Strategic Federalism and
Reproductive Rights, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 333, 337 (2017).
84
See Sarah Rogozen, Note, Prioritizing Diversity and Autonomy in the Polygamy Legalization
Debate, 24 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 144 (2017) (discussing the importance of true consent in
polygynous marriages, and arguments against the presence of consent in such relationships).
85
J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Ministering (In)justice: The Supreme Court’s Misreliance on Abortion
Regret in Gonzales v. Carhart, 17 NEV. L.J. 599, 602 (2017).
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employed in any place detrimental to her morals, her
health or her potential capacity for motherhood’”;86
•

“[G]ender
discrimination
statutes
[that]
paternalistically protected women and provided
handicap benefits to women that were not shared by
men”;87 and

•

“[S]ociety’s paternalistic view of women, not as
workers, but as mothers and caregivers, dependent
upon the financial largesse of their husbands, fathers,
or brothers.”88

Also sensibly using the gendered word paternalism to refer to an attitude
especially characteristic of men towards women, other such articles say:
•

“Muslim women aroused a paternalist instinct in the
still largely male [French] political leadership: to
protect women and girls from their men, their religion,
and its ‘archaic’ practices, [French] leaders
interpreted France’s republican values, its valeurs
républicaines, to exclude Muslim women’s dress”;89

•

“The fact that many of the cases Ruth Bader Ginsburg
brought to the Court had male plaintiffs, challenging
paternalistic laws that favored women in various
government benefits, did not make the Court’s job any
easier, because to the nine men of the Supreme Court,
the premises behind these laws—that women tended
to need protection and financial support more than
men did—made a good deal of sense and seemed, at
the least, well-intentioned if not carefully tailored”;90

•

“Male bosses reinforce paternalistic authority by
harassing or belittling women in traditionally female
fields who dared to step out of their proper place”;91

86
David Freeman Engstrom, “Not Merely There to Help the Men”: Equal Pay Laws, Collective
Rights, and the Making of the Modern Class Action, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32 (2018).
87
Gabrielle Fromer, Note, With Equal Opportunity Comes Equal Responsibility: The
Unconstitutionality of a Male-Only Draft, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 173, 188 (2017).
88
Thelma L. Harmon, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: The Equal Treatment Fallacy, 20 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 97, 99 (2017).
89
Darren Rosenblum, Sex Quotas and Burkini Bans, 92 TUL. L. REV. 469, 475 (2017).
90
Linda Greenhouse, Harry Blackmun, Independence and Path Dependence, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
1235, 1242 (2005).
91
Schultz, supra note 49, at 2087.
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•

“[T]he epitome of patriarchy and paternalism” is
“[m]ostly male physicians encouraging healthy, fertile
women to undergo procedures that will help infertile
women, at a cost and risk unknown to the donor”;92

•

“Traditional male paternalism was the primary
motivator of the decisions of male labor leaders to
represent women”;93

•

“[W]hen a state chooses to reserve its harshest
punishments for men, it offends society’s notions of
justice and reinforces paternalistic stereotypes about
women. As one editorialist put it, ‘[s]o long as
paternalistic, doting men give their “little girls” equal
rights but not equal responsibilities, we will continue
to nurture deep hatred instead of understanding’”;94

•

“Both slaves and wives were once subject to the all
encompassing paternalistic power of the male head of
the house. Arguments justifying different treatment
for the sexes on the grounds of female inferiority, need
for male protection, and happiness in their assigned
roles bear a striking resemblance to the half-truths
surrounding the myth of the ‘happy slave’”;95 and

•

“[T]he Court rejected a paternalistic view of marriage
and the decision to bear and beget a child when it
explained that while a husband has an interest in his
unborn child, he ‘has no enforceable right to require a
wife to advise him before she exercises her personal
choices . . . . A state may not give to a man the kind of
dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their
children.’”96

561

92
Kari L. Karsjens, Note, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and Patriarchy, 5
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 85 (2002).
93
Catherine T. Barbieri, Comment, Women Workers in Transition: The Potential Impact of the
NAFTA Labor Side Agreements on Women Workers in Argentina and Chile, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 526,
534 (1996).
94
Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1509–10 (1997) (second alteration in original) (footnote
omitted).
95
Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Note, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality, 12 LAW
& INEQ. 381, 411 (1994) (quoting Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a
Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (1971)).
96
Sophia M. Suarez, Note, A Woman’s Right to Dignity: Equality, Liberty, and Abortion, 11 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 470, 480 (2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992)).
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All the articles quoted in this Section sensibly use the gendered word
paternalism to convey a gendered meaning.
E. Summary
Section II began with the gendered origins of the word of paternalism,
and then showed that a great many legal scholars continue to use the
gendered word paternalism to convey a gendered meaning. Many legal
scholars sensibly use this gendered word to describe policies reinforcing
male dominance or privilege, an attitude especially characteristic of men, or
an attitude directed primarily toward women. All these many uses of the
gendered word paternalism are supported by the writers’ apparent intent to
emphasize the important relevance of gender to the writers’ points.
III. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP’S NON-GENDERED USES OF “PATERNALISM”
A. Introduction
While Section II praised legal scholars’ gendered uses of the word
paternalism, this Section criticizes legal scholars’ non-gendered uses of
paternalism. This Section contends that the widely accepted reasons for
ordinarily using gender-neutral language (to avoid reducing women’s
visibility or otherwise relegating women to secondary status) counsel against
defining paternalism without reference to gender or using the word without
mentioning any important relevance to gender or otherwise manifesting any
intent to convey a gendered meaning. Counterarguments to these
contentions are addressed at the end of this Section.
B. Non-Gendered Definitions of “Paternalism”
Many legal scholars continue to use the gendered word paternalism
without indicating any important relevance of gender, and thus without any
apparent intent to convey a gendered meaning. While gender may be
relevant to any legal issue, much legal scholarship does not emphasize or
even mention any relevance of gender. For instance, without mentioning
gender in the relevant passages, or otherwise manifesting intent to convey a
gendered meaning, several scholars, including leaders in the economic
analysis of law, cite “paternalism” as one of only two standard justifications
for restricting freedom of contract or other private ordering:
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•

“The standard justifications for mandatory restrictions
on freedom of contract are to protect people inside
(paternalism) or outside (externalities) the contract”;97

•

“A liberal state has two basic rationales for regulating
how individuals or groups use private property and
enter into contracts: externalities and paternalism”;98
and

•

“There are two justifications for
rules: paternalism and externalities.”99

mandatory

Similarly, not mentioning gender in the relevant passages or otherwise
manifesting intent to convey a gendered meaning, many legal scholars cite
“paternalism” as a standard justification for restrictions on contractual
choice, such as the unconscionability doctrine, usury laws, the minimum
wage, and countless regulations limiting the range of enforceable promises
by consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and others. For example,
law review articles in recent decades say:

97

Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032,
2084 (2012). As noted above, Ian Ayres deserves credit as one of legal scholarship’s pioneers in using
parentalism rather than “paternalism,” Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 88, so it is unclear why his 2012
Regulating Opt-Out article uses “paternalism,” especially as it exhibits gender-consciousness in passages
unrelated to its use of “paternalism.” See Ayres, supra, at 2045 (“[O]nce we see that altering rules can
be tailored to impose different altering requirements for different contracting parties, we can more easily
identify instances where altering rules discriminate on the basis of race or gender.”); id. at 2046
(“[E]xplicitly thinking about altering rules can illuminate unexamined aspects of gender discrimination .
. . .”); id. at 2111 n.214 (“I speak of the spouses-to-be in gendered terms because at that time (as is sadly
true today) my home state of Missouri did not see fit to extend equal marriage rights to same-sex
couples.”).
98
Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth,
116 YALE L.J. 226, 267 (2006). This article includes thoughtful points about gender in passages unrelated
to its use of “paternalism.” See id. at 252 (“[T]o the extent that tastes vary according to attributes such as
social class, age, gender, and ethnicity, participants in a household relationship can be expected to show
a tendency to cluster accordingly.”); id. at 317 (“Ambient norms concerning gender roles, particularly if
they have been internalized, are likely to strongly influence the allocation of co-occupants’ tasks. By
looking to customary gender roles for guidance about what gifts of labor to make, co-occupants can
reduce their transaction costs of coordination.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 311 n.326 (“Critics of the gift
exchange process among housemates assert that it systematically advantages the powerful, in particular
men over women. . . . These critics do not accept, at least in the context of inter-gender relations, the
premise that background legal and social conditions in the United States are liberal—that is, that
occupants can use either voice or exit to avoid exploitation within the home.” (citations omitted)).
99
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV.
515, 535 (1999).
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•

“Paternalism holds that restrictive contract doctrines
are justified for striking down contracts entered by
people against their own interests”;100

•

“Where incapacitation affects the borrower’s ability to
participate in the marketplace effectively, paternalism
remains a compelling reason for structuring
lender-borrower relationships according to an
objective standard”;101

•

“[O]ur current regulatory regime, from minimum
wage and maximum hour laws to child labor laws and
the Occupational Safety and Health Act are based on
paternalism”;102

•

“The invalidity of contracts of peonage or
self-enslavement, of agreements purporting to waive
the promisor’s right to obtain a divorce or sue for
relief under the bankruptcy laws, of provisions
conferring on either party a right to specifically
enforce their agreement (where no right of this sort
exists as a matter of law); the voidability of most
contracts made by infants; and the nonwaiveable
‘cooling-off’ period imposed by law in many
consumer transactions all also have, at least in part, a
paternalistic objective”;103 and

•

“Federal securities regulation contains paternalistic
features . . . . For example, no investor can be given
the opportunity to purchase a security unless the

100
Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine,
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 296 (1995)
(“It is hard to find defenders of such a position in the academic literature, but there is a widespread feeling
among contract law scholars that paternalistic attitudes account for some judges’ use of the
unconscionability doctrine in certain contract cases.” (footnote omitted)); see also Linda J. Ravdin,
Premarital Agreements and the Uniform Acts, 39 FAM. ADVOC. 34, 36 (2017) (“The UPAA rejected as
paternalistic the prevailing approach that permitted a judge to relieve a party of a bad bargain. The
UPMAA rejects a return to pre-UPAA paternalism. It retains the unconscionability standard and the
majority rule that unconscionability is determined as of execution.”).
101
Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 151,
158–59 (1988) (“Beyond the larger social interest at stake, the paternalism of usury serves a compelling
interest in the case of at least one type of borrower, the incapacitated borrower.”).
102
Mark A. Rothstein, Genetics and the Work Force of the Next Hundred Years, 2000 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 371, 392–93 (“[A]lbeit a government paternalism intended to compensate for the inequality in
bargaining power between employers and employees.”).
103
Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 764 (1983)
(footnotes omitted).
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issuer of the security has filed a registration statement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.”104
In sum, scholars in contract and related areas of law often use a
non-gendered definition of paternalism under which “a policy counts as
paternalistic if it is justified on the belief that it will make a person better off
than if the person had been left to choose between the available options for
him or herself.”105 Such policies—restricting the choices of a “person” as
likely to be a “him” as a “her”—are better described as parentalist unless
the writer indicates an important relevance of gender, or otherwise shows
the writer’s intent to convey a gendered meaning. In the absence of such
manifested intent, writers should apply the strong and widely accepted
reasons for ordinarily using gender-neutral language to avoid reducing
women’s visibility or otherwise relegating women to secondary status. So,
when a legal scholar wants to discuss limiting freedom of contract to protect
contracting parties of all genders—such as consumers, borrowers,
employees, or investors—the rationale for those limits is better described
with the gender-neutral word parentalism.
The strong and widely-accepted reasons for ordinarily using
gender-neutral language apply as well to variants of “paternalism”—such as
“libertarian paternalism”106 (which should be called “libertarian
parentalism”) and “soft paternalism”107 (which should be called “soft
parentalism”)—because these variants are generally defined without
mention of any important relevance of gender that would suggest an intent
to convey a gendered meaning, and thus justify gendered language. For
instance, recent articles contain statements like:

104

(2015).

•

“Under the philosophy of libertarian paternalism, a
person in power seeks to create policies that steer
people toward outcomes that should promote their
welfare but also allow people ‘to go their own
way’”;108

•

“[P]olicies that engage in soft paternalism—as
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein characterize it, . . .
‘tr[y] to influence choices in a way that will make
choosers better off,’ but still ensure that ‘people

Susanna Kim Ripken, Paternalism and Securities Regulation, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 11

105

Jacob Goldin, Libertarian Quasi-Paternalism, 82 MO. L. REV. 669, 669 (2017).
Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM . ECON. REV. 175 (2003),
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12876718.
107
Marvin Lim, Scrutinizing Sex Under Natural Law: Unitive Sex, Self-Gratifying Sex, and
Concepts of Harm, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 579, 632 (2017).
108
Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Nudges, 82 MO. L. REV. 695, 695 (2017) (footnote omitted).
106
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should be free . . . to opt out of [specific] arrangements
if they [choose] to do so’”;109 and
•

“[A] number of behavioral science professors and law
professors advocate policies and regulations known as
forms of soft paternalism. Examples of soft
paternalism are defaulting people into 401(k)
retirement plans and cooling-off periods before
marriage or divorce and for home-solicitation sales.
Types of soft paternalism include libertarian
paternalism, which endeavors to preserve people’s
freedom of choice, while intending to influence
people’s choices to make them better off; asymmetric
paternalism, which strives to produce large benefits to
people who are prone to decision-making errors, while
imposing little or even no costs on those who are not
prone to decision-making errors; cautious
paternalism, which requires that policymakers
determine conditions under which policy benefits
outweigh costs; and light paternalism, which attempts
to enhance individual choice without restricting it.”110

Such policies that “influence people’s choices,” when those people may
be of any gender, are better described as parentalist unless the writer
indicates an important relevance of gender, or otherwise shows the writer’s
intent to convey a gendered meaning. In the absence of such manifested
intent, writers should apply the strong and widely accepted reasons for
ordinarily using gender-neutral language to avoid reducing women’s
visibility or otherwise relegating women to secondary status. So instead of
creating and discussing variants of “paternalism”—such as “libertarian
paternalism” or “soft paternalism”—legal scholars should use the
gender-neutral parentalism, as in “libertarian parentalism” or “soft
parentalism.”
C. Non-Gendered Uses of “Paternalism”
The previous subsection quoted legal scholarship defining
“paternalism,” and variants thereof, in non-gendered ways and cited those
passages as examples of writing in which replacing paternalism with
parentalism seems warranted by the widely accepted reasons for
gender-neutral language to avoid reducing women’s visibility or otherwise
relegating women to secondary status. This Section continues in that vein by
109

Lim, supra note 107, at 632 (third, fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations in original).
Peter H. Huang, Achieving American Retirement Prosperity by Changing Americans’ Thinking
About Retirement, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 189, 228 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
110
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quoting other legal scholarship using paternalism without suggesting any
important relevance to gender and thus no apparent intent to convey a
gendered meaning. Thus, in each of the following quotes replacing
paternalism with parentalism seems warranted by the widely accepted
reasons for gender-neutral language.
1. “Paternalism” Contrasted with Autonomy or Liberty
Several legal scholars use the word paternalism as an opposite of
autonomy or liberty:
•

[A] “prominent theory of rights . . . imposing limits on
the state . . . claim[s] that a person’s autonomy is
violated if he is treated on the basis of certain
impermissible—that is, moralistic or paternalistic—
considerations”;111

•

“Paternalism is widespread throughout our legal
system and is undeniably a restriction on freedom.
Our society has decided that in certain situations, the
government oversight is worth the restriction. For
example, society has rightly decided that paternalistic
decisions regarding seat belt laws, or laws that bar
riding a motorcycle without a helmet, are worth the
restriction on our freedoms”;112

•

“There is undoubtedly a libertarian flavor to
autonomy theories of contract, and certainly such
theories provide ample resources to criticize
paternalist impulses in contract law. Judges and
legislators ought not to substitute their vision of the
good for that of the parties to a contract”;113

•

“Libertarians will generally prefer cash transfer
schemes rather than in-kind programs on the grounds
that cash transfers promote recipients’ autonomy and
self-ownership, whereas in-kind transfers exemplify
the type of paternalism that libertarianism abhors”;114
and

111
Kapsaski Ifigeneia, Dignity, Rights, and the Role of Consent in German Criminal Law, 54 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 401, 417 (2017).
112
Gregg M. Jacobson, Unnecessary Paternalism: Why Bad Faith Limitations on Liability Should
Be Enforced Between Sophisticated Entities, 12 J. AM. C. CONSTRUCTION LAW. 103, 105 (2018).
113
Nathan B. Oman, Reconsidering Contractual Consent: Why We Shouldn’t Worry Too Much
About Boilerplate and Other Puzzles, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 215, 222 (2017).
114
Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income,
2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1234.
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“If paternalism involves the substitution of one’s
judgment with another agent’s, egalitarians may need
to acknowledge the role of paternalism in support of a
large public sector.”115

As the autonomy or liberty of a person of any gender may be at issue,
legal scholarship should describe the opposite of autonomy or liberty as
parentalism rather than paternalism, unless the writer indicates some
important relevance of gender to justify gendered language.
2. “Paternalism” Contrasted with the Autonomy to Control One’s
Own Body
Other articles in legal journals contrast “paternalism” with the autonomy
or liberty to control one’s own body:
•

“Standard examples of . . . paternalist legislation
[include] bans on the sale of body parts”;116

•

“Criminal paternalism, for example, would allow
persons to be punished when their acts cause
significant harms to the very persons who commit
them”;117

•

“[I]ndividual acts of autonomy impact[ing] on
individual well-being (e.g. acts of self-harm)” “is the
quintessential clash animating debates between
liberals/libertarians and paternalists”;118

•

“[P]ublic health initiatives that require behavioral
changes [such as addressing tobacco use, insufficient
physical activity, and poor diet] are vulnerable to
criticism that they smack of paternalism or interfere
with individual liberty”;119 and

•

“[T]he relationship between paternalism and liberty is
a zero-sum game: every paternalistic move to protect
persons who are drunk from decisions they may later

115

Eric Beerbohm, Must Rawlsians Be Hamiltonians? Small Government and Political Illiberalism,
62 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 27 (2017).
116
Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro, A Pluralist Case for the Harm Principle, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 361,
361 (2017).
117
Douglas Husak, What’s Legal About Legal Moralism?, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 381, 398 (2017).
118
John Danaher, Robotic Rape and Robotic Child Sexual Abuse: Should They Be Criminalised?,
11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 71, 78 (2017).
119
Jessica Mantel, Tackling the Social Determinants of Health: A Central Role for Providers, 33
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 234 (2017).
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regret does so at the cost of limiting the liberty of
persons to decide such matters for themselves.”120
As the body at issue in these examples may belong to a person of any
gender, legal scholarship should describe policies restricting that person’s
autonomy to control that body as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless
the writer indicates some important relevance of gender to justify gendered
language.
3. Consumers of Soda, Alcohol, or the Like as Objects of
“Paternalism”
Further, several law journal articles describe consumers of potentially
harmful products (like soda, alcohol, or marijuana) as objects of
“paternalism”:
•

“One academic saw [a court decision overturning
New York City’s prohibition on restaurants serving
certain sugary drinks in large sizes] as a rejection of
an unappealing variety of paternalism, and in some
circles Mayor Bloomberg [who proposed the soda
regulation] was dubbed ‘Nanny Bloomberg’”;121

•

“When government is perceived as taking away
choice in an area of daily living as basic and
fundamental as food and drink, Americans sometimes
view such efforts with skepticism, especially if the
reasons for the proposed limitations are viewed as
paternalistic. When a state or local government
proposes to tax soda, paternalism concerns are often
compounded by suspicion that citizens who are more
vulnerable will be asked to shoulder an unfair tax
burden”;122 and refer to

•

“Paternalistic nudges (nudges that seek to influence
people’s choices in their own interests, such as those
aimed at discouraging smoking).”123

As the consumer at issue may be of any gender, legal scholarship should
describe laws or policies discouraging consumption of soda, alcohol, or

120
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Peter Westen, How to Think (Like a Lawyer) About Rape, 11 CRIM.
L. & PHIL. 759, 787 (2017).
121
David Ray Papke & Mary Elise Papke, A Foe More Than a Friend: Law and the Health of the
American Urban Poor, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 21 (2017) (footnote omitted).
122
David A. Dana & Janice Nadler, Soda Taxes as a Legal and Social Movement, 13 NW. J. L. &
SOC. POL’Y 84, 106 (2018) (footnote omitted).
123
Kiran Iyer, Nudging Virtue, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 469, 472 (2017).
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marijuana as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates
some important relevance of gender to justify gendered language.
4. Consumers of
“Paternalism”

FDA-Regulated

Products

as

Objects

of

Similarly, several pieces of legal scholarship describe consumers of
products (actually or possibly) regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) or other lawmakers as objects of “paternalism”:
•

“The 1962 Amendments [to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act] ushered in a new era of paternalism in
drug regulation: the requirement that a sponsor
demonstrate a drug’s efficacy before consumers can
access it removes the choice from patients and their
physicians of whether to take a risk on a drug that
might offer important benefits but has not been
adequately proven to do so”;124

•

“[T]he FDA is making a paternalistic value
judgment—that it is better to ensure zero negative
reactions by limiting consumer access to [genetic
testing] information across the board than to allow
people to make their own choices about whether the
tests are appropriate for them”;125

•

“Gradually, however, federal law shifted from a focus
on empowering patients, to a more paternalistic
approach—one that in practice is often preoccupied
with erecting roadblocks. This reached fruition in the
1962 Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
required manufacturers to ‘provide substantial
evidence of effectiveness for the product’s intended
use’”;126

•

“A fifth argument asserted for the right to promote
off-label says that the FDA is acting paternalistically,
aiming to protect patients from making poor

124
Kyle T. Edwards, The Role of Patient Participation in Drug Approvals: Lessons from the
Accelerated Approval of Eteplirsen, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 406, 413 (2017).
125
Shelby Baird, Note, Don’t Try This at Home: The FDA’s Restrictive Regulation of Home-Testing
Devices, 67 DUKE L.J. 383, 424 (2017).
126
Christina Sandefur, Safeguarding the Right to Try, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 515 (2017) (footnote
omitted).
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consumption decisions based on what they (or their
physicians) hear in the promotions”;127
•

“The motivation for this paternalistic intervention [of
a federal prohibition of drugs, such as the Anti-Drug
Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, which raises prices of
these drugs and reduces their availability] is simple:
drugs can be bad for users and for their families”;128
and

•

“Eliminating [the FDA’s ability to restrict some
methods by which pharmaceutical firms promote their
products] could push the FDA to look to other—
frequently more paternalistic—options, such as
product gatekeeping or restrictions on product use, to
achieve its public health mission.”129

As consumers of most or all FDA-regulated products may be of any
gender, legal scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting such
consumers’ choices as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer
indicates some important relevance of gender to justify gendered language.
5. Consumer Debtors and Consumers Generally as Objects of
“Paternalism”
Additionally, several pieces in law journals describe consumers, or
consumer debtors, as objects of “paternalism”:
•

“When it comes to consumer protection, paternalism
is not a hot issue in Europe: very few authors feel the
need to criticize or, as the case may be, justify
paternalism. In consumer law particularly,
paternalism goes back such a long way in the national
traditions of some of the founding Member States that
it is hardly questioned”;130

•

“‘[P]rivate paternalism,’ . . . [b]est articulated by Omri
Ben-Shahar, . . . asserts that, regardless of the process

127
Christopher Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right to Promote Drugs OffLabel, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1019, 1044 (2017).
128
Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Dealing More Effectively and Humanely with Illegal
Drugs, 46 CRIME & JUST. 95, 111 (2017), https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/688458.
129
Patricia J. Zettler, The Indirect Consequences of Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1053, 1060 (2017).
130
Geneviève Helleringer & Anne-Lise Sibony, European Consumer Protection Through the
Behavioral Lens, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 607, 611 (2017).
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by which boilerplate is created, its content is good for
the majority of consumers”;131
•

“[J]udicial review of a reaffirmation agreement [by a
debtor in bankruptcy] is largely a paternalistic
endeavor wherein a bankruptcy court is obligated to
independently consider and reject, if appropriate, an
agreement between private parties”;132

•

“As a result [of the CARD Act], it is surely true that
some consumers are paternalistically prevented from
running up credit card debts that they can’t pay”;133
and

•

“When he was in the House, [Rep. Randy Neugebauer
(R-TX), who complained that Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau regulations restricted access to
credit,] opposed actions to regulate payday loans,
labeling the effort as ‘paternalistic erosion of
consumer product choices.’”134

As consumers, including consumer debtors, may be of any gender, legal
scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting such consumers’
choices as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates
some important relevance of gender to justify gendered language.
6. Consumers of Speech or Information as Objects of “Paternalism”
Likewise, several law journal articles describe recipients of speech or
information as objects of “paternalism”:
•

“[M]any [Campbell law students] bridled at what they
viewed as the [Campbell law] faculty’s paternalism . .
. [such as] the required curriculum”;135

•

“Rejecting the state’s ‘highly paternalistic’ regulatory
approach, the Court argued instead for relying on the

131

James Gibson, Boilerplate’s False Dichotomy, 106 GEO. L.J. 249, 261 (2018).
Ryan W. Johnson, 24 Variations of a Reaffirmation Agreement and the Corresponding Actions
Required by the Court, 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 26 (2018).
133
Jason Scott Johnston, The Freedom to Fail: Market Access as the Path to Overcoming Poverty
and Inequality, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 43 (2017).
134
Legislative Highlights, 36 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10 (2017); see also Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 5 (2016)
(statement of Rep. Randy Neugebauer, Chairman of the H. Subcomm.).
135
Richard A. Lord, In Memoriam: F. Leary Davis: Death of a Dream Salesman, 40 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 13, 23 (2018).
132
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free market as the mechanism that would ensure the
best expressive environment for consumers”;136
•

“[W]hen a government chooses to suppress this free
flow of information, [the government acts] in
precisely the sort of paternalistic manner that the First
Amendment forbids”;137

•

“[T]he Court has disfavored paternalistic attempts to
protect consumers from the possibility of receiving
misleading information and has favored allowing
more commercial speech”;138 and

•

“[The Court has described the] ‘highly paternalistic
approach’ of suppressing speech because of its effects
on listeners.”139

As recipients of speech or information may be of any gender, legal
scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting those recipients’
sources of information as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the
writer indicates some important relevance of gender to justify gendered
language.
7. Lawyers’ Clients as Objects of “Paternalism”
Many law review articles also describe lawyers’ clients as objects of
“paternalism”:
•

“Avoiding lawyer paternalism [toward clients] is
arguably a guiding principle of the Model Rules.
Toward that end, the Rules require full disclosure to a
client to the maximum extent possible”;140

•

“[T]he blanket ban on nonlawyers’ legal advice that
applies in most jurisdictions does not seem to be
narrowly drawn . . . . Such paternalistic and

136
Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1427 (2017).
137
Daniel D. Bracciano, Comment, Commercial Speech Doctrine and Virginia’s ‘Thirsty Thursday’
Ban, 27 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 207, 238 (2017).
138
Lauren Myers, Note, A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Material-Connection Disclosures:
Endorsers, Instagram, and the Federal Trade Commission’s Endorsement Guides, 66 DUKE L.J. 1371,
1400 (2017).
139
David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of Practical Obscurity,
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1428 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375 (2002)).
140
Elinor R. Jordan, Point, Click, Green Card: Can Technology Close the Gap in Immigrant Access
to Justice?, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 287, 337 (2017) (footnote omitted).
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prophylactic bans have seldom been accepted by the
Supreme Court”;141
•

Scholars have raised “the question of whether lawyers
are overly paternalistic to their clients”;142

•

“[A]ttorneys’ relationships with juveniles have
transitioned from an initially more paternalistic model
(i.e., best interests) to more of a legal advocacy role
(i.e., expressed interest model)”;143

•

“The cocooning of lawyers from their ethical
conscience may, in fact, also harm their clients in that
lawyers with anesthetized moral consciences may
impose solutions paternalistically on clients who
would not have wanted their interest pursued at all
costs had they been engaged in a ‘moral dialogue’”;144
and

•

“[T]he tribal lawyer who excessively second-guesses
the authority of an authorized agent risks
paternalistically depriving the tribe of its autonomy as
a political entity and as a client.”145

As lawyers’ clients may be of any gender, legal scholarship should
describe laws or policies restricting their information or choices as
parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some
important relevance of gender to justify gendered language.
8. Medical Patients as Objects of “Paternalism”
A number of law articles describe medical patients as objects of
“paternalism”:
•

“The paternalism that characterized the past practice
of medicine, where physicians were presumed to

141
Michele Cotton, Improving Access to Justice by Enforcing the Free Speech Clause, 83 BROOK.
L. REV. 111, 149 (2017).
142
David Luban & W. Bradley Wendel, Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History, 30
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 337, 342-43 (2017).
143
Erika Fountain & Jennifer L. Woolard, The Capacity for Effective Relationships Among
Attorneys, Juvenile Clients, and Parents, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 493, 499 (2017).
144
JoNel Newman & Donald Nicolson, A Tale of Two Clinics: Similarities and Differences in
Evidence of the “Clinic Effect” on the Development of Law Students’ Ethical and Altruistic Professional
Identities, 35 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 8 (2017).
145
Michael J. Lockman, An Ethical Representation of Sovereign Clients in Debt Disputes, 30 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 85 (2017).
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know what is best for patients, has been replaced with
respect for patient autonomy”;146
•

“Health care providers are shifting away from a
paternalistic approach to patient care and moving
towards a partnership approach”;147

•

“Whereas
traditionally,
physicians
would
paternalistically make decisions for their patients,
patients now have a much greater role in medical
decision making”;148

•

“Nursing homes have historically taken the position
that their duty of care to residents requires that, in
some quasi-paternalistic view, they err on the side of
protecting the ‘vulnerable’ resident from harm”;149

•

“These
approaches
[patient-centered, or
client-centered, care in helping professions such as
doctors and social workers charged with treating their
patients, and lawyers charged with representing their
clients] actively involve the patient or client in
information-gathering and decision-making (in
contrast to more paternalistic and traditional
approaches to patient care)”;150 and

•

“Even a well-intended physician may be more
paternalistic when dealing with elderly and disabled
patients.”151

As medical patients may be of any gender, legal scholarship should
describe laws or policies restricting their information or choices as
parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some
important relevance of gender to justify gendered language.

146
Jessica Mantel, Refusing to Treat Noncompliant Patients Is Bad Medicine, 39 CARDOZO L. REV.
127, 160-61 (2017).
147
S. Allan Adelman, The Evolution of Patient Rights: Individual Benefits and Provider Burdens,
10 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 66, 72 (2017).
148
Hilary Young, A Proposal for Access to Treatment Contrary to Clinical Judgment, 11 MCGILL
J.L. & HEALTH 1, 5 (2017).
149
Roy G. Spece, Jr. et al., (Implicit) Consent to Intimacy, 50 IND. L. REV. 907, 919 (2017).
150
Debra Chopp, Addressing Cultural Bias in the Legal Profession, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 364, 395 (2017).
151
Browne Lewis, A Deliberate Departure: Making Physician-Assisted Suicide Comfortable for
Vulnerable Patients, 70 ARK. L. REV. 1, 41 (2017).
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9. Investors as Objects of “Paternalistic” Policies
Some legal scholarship uses the word “paternalistic” to describe policies
designed to protect investors:
•

“[M]erit regulation [of securities] is paternalistic,
predicated on the notion that investors are unable to
determine which investments further their interests
and which do not”;152

•

“Where dissenter’s rights are imposed by statute there
is a paternalistic protection afforded a potentially
dissenting member to the disadvantage of the LLC and
the remaining members”;153 and

•

“Human investors are locked out of direct investments
in hedge funds themselves by a variety of
paternalistic, if well-meaning, rules, which include
requirements that investors must be able to change
their allocation of investments in 401(k)s at least once
every three months, and by the reality that almost all
hedge funds offer only unregistered securities and are
thus prohibited from securing investments from
anyone who is not a so-called ‘accredited investor’
under Regulation D.”154

As investors may be of any gender, legal scholarship should describe
laws or policies restricting their information or choices as parentalist rather
than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some important relevance of
gender to justify gendered language.
10. Employees as Objects of “Paternalistic” Policies
Some articles in law journals describe employees as objects of
“paternalistic” policies:
•

“Traditionally, employers had a more paternalistic
role of defining and funding the benefits that
employees most needed.”155

152
Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory Damage, 92 TUL.
L. REV. 339, 378 (2017).
153
Thomas E. Rutledge & Katharine M. Sagan, An Amendment Too Far?: Limits on the Ability of
Less Than All Members to Amend the Operating Agreement, 16 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 1, 34 (2017).
154
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge
Fund Activism and Our Stranger Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1934-35 (2016)
(footnote omitted).
155
Lauren R. Roth, Redefining “Medical Care”, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 70 (2017).
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“Railroads commonly adopted paternalistic policies
toward their employees.”156

As employees may be of any gender, legal scholarship should describe
laws or policies restricting their information or choices as parentalist rather
than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some important relevance of
gender to justify gendered language.
11. Entire Peoples as Objects of “Paternalism”
Several pieces of legal scholarship describe entire peoples as objects of
“paternalism”:
•

“The federal government’s ‘paternalistic federal
management policies’ and ‘failure to acknowledge the
tribes’ sovereign powers’ has allowed others to
exploit tribal reservations”;157

•

“There is at least a healthy dose of skepticism,
however, among some about using the trust
responsibility [in which the federal government acts
as ‘trustee’ over Indian trust lands] to perpetuate what
is seen as a paternalistic federal trust structure, and an
associated implication of Indian incompetence, rather
than using the federal trust relationship as a true
platform for indigenous self-governance and
self-determination”;158

•

“The [Hawaiian Home Commission] Act is inherently
flawed because it is rooted in racism and shot through
with paternalism. . . . Paternalism is reflected in the
Act because native Hawaiians become wards of the
government by having to pay rent for the lands,
instead of being given lands fee simple”;159 and

•

“[W]e tend to paternalistically discard suggestions
that most Palestinians might agree with their elected
government which we deem extremist (Hamas), and

156
Robert J. Kaczorowski, From Petitions for Gratuities to Claims for Damages: Personal Injuries
and Railroads During the Industrialization of the United States, 57 A M. J. LEGAL HIST. 261, 285 (2017).
157
Jin Hyung Lee, Establishing Applicable Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters on Indian
Reservations, 66 EMORY L.J. 965, 1000-01 (2017).
158
Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty, and the
Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487, 542 (2017).
159
Troy J.H. Andrade, (Re)Righting History: Deconstructing the Court’s Narrative of Hawai‘i’s
Past, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 631, 677 (2017) (citations omitted).
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so we choose to ignore any Palestinian discourse
disconfirming our wishful perceptions.”160
As entire peoples may include individuals of any gender, legal
scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting or devaluing their
choices as parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates
some important relevance of gender to justify gendered language.
12. Children as Objects of “Paternalism”
Several law review articles describe children as the objects of
“paternalism”:
•

“[J]uvenile defenders face . . . the challenge of
paternalism, which threatens to deprive children of
meaningful choice and voice in the delinquency
system”;161

•

“The ‘no excuses’ model sets up charter schools
designed to actively address the attributes thought to
hold back low income students through a hands-on,
paternalistic model of behavioral modification and
direction”;162

•

“The infancy doctrine is a middle ground between
complete freedom of contract for youth and a
paternalistic prohibition on their entering into binding
agreements”;163 and

•

The Convention on the Rights of the Child “pivoted
local and international charitable organizations away
from paternalistic approaches to child protection and
toward the placement of children at the heart of their
own human rights recognition.”164

As children may be of any gender, legal scholarship should describe
laws or policies restricting their information or choices as parentalist rather
than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some important relevance of
gender to justify gendered language.
160
Sanda Kaufman, Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Should They Listen to Us?
Seeking a Negotiation/Conflict Resolution Contribution to Practice in Intractable Conflicts, 2017 J. DISP.
RESOL. 73, 86.
161
Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to Counsel, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 650
(2017).
162
Amy L. Wax, Educating the Disadvantaged–Two Models, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 687,
693 (2017).
163
Kevin Lapp, Taking Back Juvenile Confessions, 64 UCLA L. REV. 902, 940 (2017).
164
Janet E. Lord, Child Rights Trending: Accommodating Children with Disabilities in the Global
Human Rights Framework and US Foreign Policy, 16 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 1, 3 (2017).
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13. Disabled Persons as Objects of “Paternalism”
Many pieces of legal scholarship describe disabled persons as objects of
“paternalism”:
•

“Article 12 challenges long-standing paternalistic
laws and policies that had deprived people with
disabilities throughout the world of their right to make
and exercise decisions that people who are not labeled
as disabled are free to make every day”;165

•

“Despite their intensive paternalism and strict rules,
home officials [overseeing institutions for disabled
veterans] emphasized the home aspect of the
institutions in an attempt to differentiate them from
other charitable institutions”;166

•

“The independent living model is part of the larger
disability rights movement and social model of
disability, which ‘developed as a reaction to the
perceived paternalism and oppression that attended a
welfare-based response to disability’”;167

•

“[T]his assumption invites the return of a paternalistic
view of disabled persons—an attitude which the
disability community has worked long and hard to
eradicate: [It] threatens to set back decades of
legislative action and social advocacy devoted to the
goal of empowering the disabled to take control over
every aspect of their lives”;168 and

•

“Disability is viewed socially as a personal trag-edy
[sic] or misfortune that requires charitable giving,
pity, and paternalism from society.”169

As disabled persons may be of any gender, legal scholarship should
describe laws or policies restricting their choices as parentalist rather than
165
Arlene S. Kanter & Yotam Tolub, The Fight for Personhood, Legal Capacity, and Equal
Recognition Under Law for People with Disabilities in Israel and Beyond, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 557,
575 (2017).
166
Rabia Belt, Ballots for Bullets?: Disabled Veterans and the Right to Vote, 69 STAN. L. REV. 435,
463 (2017) (emphasis omitted).
167
Andrea Kozak-Oxnard, Care and Community Empowerment: Coalition-Building Between Home
Care Workers and Disability Rights Activists, 35 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 70, 80 (2017).
168
Kathryn L. Tucker, Building Bridges Between the Civil Rights Movements of People with
Disabilities and Those with Terminal Illness, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 329, 340–41 (2017) (second alteration
in original) (citation omitted).
169
Doron Dorfman, Re-Claiming Disability: Identity, Procedural Justice, and the Disability
Determination Process, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 195, 199 (2017).
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paternalist, unless the writer indicates some important relevance of gender
to justify gendered language.
14. Miscellaneous Objects of “Paternalism”
Legal scholarship includes a variety of other people, who could be of
any gender, described as objects of “paternalism.” Numerous examples
include:
•

“Poverty regulation actively pressed poor people into
the worst jobs . . . . Such [regulation] is . . .
paternalistic in its use of authority to manage and
monitor poor people’s behaviors”;170

•

“Congress paternalistically justified BACT [the Best
Available Control Technology mandated by the EPA
and authorized by the Clean Air Act] by claiming that
by imposing BACT, states would have more room for
economic growth under the increment because all
sources would be required to install state-of-the-art
controls”;171

•

“Some modern scholars believe that African
Americans actually became worse off after the Civil
War as ‘they lost the paternalistic slave health care
system and very little was available to replace it’”;172

•

“Negating [an individual’s actual expressed] consent
[to sexual acts because that individual was
intoxicated] may not only result in criminalizing
innocuous behaviors, when an actor relies on a
partner’s express assent to sex, but it is also notably
paternalistic, raising concerns that the law
impermissibly interferes with this partner’s sexual
behavior in circumstances where the partner might be
making less than prudent decisions that [the partner]
would not have made had the partner’s judgment not
been clouded by intoxication”;173

170

Nantiya Ruan, Corporate Masters & Low-Wage Servants: The Social Control of Workers in
Poverty, 24 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 103, 108–09 (2017).
171
John C. Evans & Donald van der Vaart, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: A Case for
Repeal, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,742, 10,746 (2017).
172
Anna Blackburne-Rigsby, The Importance of a Diverse Judiciary to Closing the Historic
“Health” Gap Between Blacks and Whites, and President Obama’s Legacy, 60 HOW. L.J. 641, 654
(2017) (emphasis omitted).
173
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Conundrum of Voluntary Intoxication and Sex, 82 BROOK.
L. REV. 1031, 1067 (2017).
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•

“[A]lthough court officials and police officers assert
that they direct low-income families into the juvenile
justice system out of a desire to provide ‘help,’ this
paternalistic attitude ultimately allows the state to
attain social control over a wider swath of the
poor”;174

•

“[A] strong paternalism argument . . . can arise when
there is a reason to believe people will fail to
adequately look out for their own interests, such as
laws restricting gambling out of concern for the social
costs of gambling addictions and the impact on
disadvantaged or vulnerable populations; critics of
marijuana legalization have raised similar
arguments”;175

•

“One who has violated the law deserves to lose the
protection against paternalistic interference that other
adult citizens enjoy as a matter of right”;176

•

“The family [in need of ongoing social services] may
truly require assistance but refuse to succumb to the
paternalistic notion of state oversight”;177

•

“[N]udge theory . . . strikes a delicate balance between
private and public regulation by paternalistically
nudging people through a choice-architecture that
does not eliminate or reduce freedom of choice”;178

•

Prosecuting jaywalkers “can be justified by the idea of
paternalism—the idea that people should be protected
from their own foolishness and that the State knows
better than the individual”;179

•

“For supporters, basic income does several things: it
eliminates poverty; counters rising income inequality;
[and] non-paternalistically promotes freedom because

581

174
Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney,
58 B.C. L. REV. 379, 414 (2017).
175
Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383,
443–44 (2017) (footnote omitted).
176
Linda Radzik, Desert of What? On Murphy’s Reluctant Retributivism, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 161,
167 (2017).
177
Rakesh Beniwal, Implicit Bias in Child Welfare: Overcoming Intent, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1021,
1037 (2017).
178
Dana Pugach & Michal Tamir, Nudging the Criminal Justice System into Listening to Crime
Victims in Plea Agreements, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 45, 62 (2017).
179
Michael Lewyn, The Criminalization of Walking, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167, 1194.
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recipients are free to use their basic income in
whatever way they deem appropriate, in contrast to
traditional means-tested and in-kind welfare state
policies”;180 and
•

“[A] truly paternalistic copyright regime would
provide meaningful protections for authors against
one-sided copyright transfers and would rely on more
tailored and direct incentives for artistic creation.”181

As the relevant people in any of these examples may be of any gender,
legal scholarship should describe laws or policies restricting their choices as
parentalist rather than paternalist, unless the writer indicates some
important relevance of gender to justify gendered language.
D. Arguments for Using Paternalism to Describe Laws Restricting People
of All Genders
1. Overview
The previous two subsections quoted legal scholarship defining and
using the word “paternalism” without suggesting any important relevance to
gender and thus no apparent intent to convey a gendered meaning. These
quotes refer to laws or policies aiming to protect people by restricting their
choices. As the objects of these laws and policies may be of any gender,
replacing paternalism with parentalism in each of these quotes is
presumptively warranted by the general presumption for gender-neutral
language (summarized in Section I) to avoid reducing women’s visibility or
otherwise relegating women to secondary status. This argument for the
gender-neutral word parentalism may prompt several counterarguments,
including: (A) all laws are gendered male; (B) restricting people’s choices
(even to protect those people) is gendered male; and (C) paternalism’s
negative connotations attach to men.
2. Law as Gendered Male
If one believes that all our laws are gendered male then one might well
believe laws or policies aiming to protect people by restricting their choices
are gendered male, even if persons of any gender may be the objects of these
laws or policies. The belief that all our laws are gendered male might follow
from the fairly common feminist view that “law perpetuates patriarchy and

180

Matthew Dimick, Better Than Basic Income? Liberty, Equality, and the Regulation of Working
Time, 50 IND. L. REV. 473, 476 (2017).
181
Kevin J. Hickey, Copyright Paternalism, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 415, 416 (2017).
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has done so for centuries, across the globe, and in all aspects of life.”182 For
instance, Deborah Threedy writes:
American law has, until very recently, been constructed almost
exclusively by the male gender. Therefore, it should not be
surprising that ‘law’ incorporates and reflects male gender
traits. Some of these traits are identified as the preference for
rationality over other ways of knowing (e.g., intuition); for
objectivity over subjectivity; for abstraction over
contextualization; and for hierarchical decision-making over
consensus or compromise. Contract law, like law more
generally, is said to be male-gendered because of the perceived
presence of these traits. In other words, contract law is not
neutral; it is one of the many social structures that supports a
male preference.183
Arguments along these lines might plausibly justify using gendered
language to discuss any law—including using the gendered word
paternalism to describe laws aiming to protect people of all genders by
restricting their choices—because a writer making such an argument would
be manifesting an intent to convey a gendered meaning: all our laws are
gendered male. In other words, a writer who says all our laws are gendered
male thereby justifies that writer’s use of the gendered word paternalism
much as a writer is justified in using that gendered word to refer to the
institutionalization of male dominance or an attitude especially
characteristic of men.184
3. Protecting Others by Restricting Their Choices as Gendered Male
Even a writer who does not argue that all our laws are gendered male
might argue that laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting
their choices are gendered male. That is, one might argue that protecting-by
-restricting-choice is gendered male, so laws doing this are gendered male.
The propensity to believe that protecting-by-restricting-choice is
gendered male may depend on which analogy one makes. One view is that
laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their choices are
analogous to situations, discussed in Section II, in which men purportedly
aim (by law or otherwise) to protect women by restricting women’s
182
Robin West, Women in the Legal Academy: A Brief History of Feminist Legal Theory, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 998 (2018) (describing the “critical claim” of “[f]eminist legal theory from the
1980s and 1990s”). See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
163 (1989) (“The state is male jurisprudentially, meaning that it adopts the standpoint of male power on
the relation between law and society.”).
183
Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1999)
(footnotes omitted).
184
See supra Sections II.A–B.
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choices.185
Under
this
view,
one
might
plausibly
see
protecting-by-restricting-choice laws (aiming to protect people of all
genders) as gendered male. In this view’s analogy, the people protected and
restricted by such laws are analogous to women and the lawmakers are
analogous to men.
In
contrast,
the
alternative
view
analogizes
protecting-by-restricting-choice laws to parenting, so the people protected
and restricted by such laws are analogous to children, while the lawmakers
are analogous to parents and other caretakers of children. This seems the
better analogy for the same reasons our society and legal profession have
largely moved to gender-neutral language: protecting (only) women by
restricting (only) women’s choices reduces women’s visibility, “relegates
girls and women to ‘secondary status,’” and thus “not only reflects but also
helps to construct and perpetuate a sexist reality.”186 In contrast, protecting
children (of all genders) by restricting children’s choices raises no such
concerns, and laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting
their choices raise no such concerns. Sexism is not central to concerns about
either laws aiming to protect people of all genders by restricting their
choices, or to concerns about protecting children (of all genders187) by
restricting their choices. In this important respect, laws aiming to protect
people of all genders by restricting their choices are more analogous to
parents aiming to protect children (of all genders) by restricting their choices
than to men purportedly aiming to protect women by restricting women’s
choices.
Furthermore, while many doubt that men purporting to protect women
by restricting women’s choices are sincerely trying to protect women, as
opposed to privilege men,188 even libertarians (like me) opposed to many
laws restricting people’s choices ostensibly for their own good can concede
that many supporters of such laws are sincerely trying to protect vulnerable
people, much as many parents restricting their children’s choices are
sincerely trying to protect their children—such as by restraining an
impulsive toddler about to run into the street without checking for oncoming
cars. So, laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their
choices should be analogized, not to protecting women by restricting
women’s choices, but to parents protecting children (of all genders) by
restricting children’s choices.
And if one analogizes laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by
restricting their choices to parents protecting children (of all genders) by
185

See supra Section II.A.
Fischer, supra note 29, at 222 (citations omitted).
187
In contrast, sexism may be very relevant to parents treating their sons and daughters differently
with respect to protecting them by restricting their choices.
188
See infra note 207.
186
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restricting children’s choices, then characterizing such laws as gendered
collides with the fact that parents of all genders protect their children by
restricting their children’s choices.189 In other words, analogizing
protect-by-restricting-choice laws to parenting strengthens the case for
describing such laws as (gender-neutral) parentalism rather than
paternalism. In Rob Atkinson’s words,
I say “parentalism” rather than “paternalism” in part to avoid
the latter term’s connotations of officious intermeddling, but
primarily to use a gender-neutral synonym. At least in my own
experience, concern for another’s welfare combined with a
claim of superior insight into the other’s needs can come from
a parent of either sex.190
However, while modern life confirms that “concern for another’s
welfare combined with a claim of superior insight into the other’s needs can
come from a parent of” any gender, that parental “concern for another’s
welfare” is not always expressed by parental restrictions on their children’s
choices.191 For instance, Peter Huang reports:
I was once asked upon the start of a talk with discussion of
some ideas related to paternalism, why the word “maternal”
typically evokes positive connotations and emotions, but the
word “paternal” usually evokes negative connotations and
emotions. A member of that audience suggested that one
reason is that mothers frame their interventions (e.g., “let me
help you do that”) differently than fathers do (e.g., “do this and
don’t do that”). Another member of the audience volunteered
that dads and moms generally engage in different substantive
types of parental interventions, perhaps due to a traditional
sexual division of labor or outdated gender stereotypes.192
These audience members may be suggesting that fathers, more than
mothers, protect their children by restricting their children’s choices. And
perhaps empirical studies would show that “protect-by-restricting-choice”
parenting is gendered, that is, significantly more common among fathers
than mothers.193 Such data might plausibly justify using the gendered word
189

See infra Section IV.A.6.
Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 523 n.73 (1990).
191
Id.
192
Peter H. Huang, Authentic Happiness, Self-Knowledge and Legal Policy, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 755, 779 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
193
“Research on parenting during adolescence has shown that fathers tend to be less warm and
more restrictive than mothers.” Matthew F. Bumpus et al., Parental Autonomy Granting During
Adolescence: Exploring Gender Differences in Context, 37 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 163, 166 (2001)
(citing R. D. Parke, Fathers and Families, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PARENTING 27, 27–63 (M.H. Bornstein
ed., 1995)).
190
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paternalism to describe laws or policies aiming to protect people (of all
genders) by restricting their choices because such data would support
analogizing such laws specifically to fathering, rather than generally to
parenting.
On the other hand, perhaps empirical studies would show that
“protect-by-restricting-choice” parenting is actually gendered female, that
is, significantly more common among mothers than fathers. “Perhaps fathers
seek to make their children strong and independent while mothers seek to
keep them close to home and safe.”194 That conjecture by Joseph William
Singer would suggest that laws treating parties as “strong and independent”
are more paternal, while laws aiming to protect parties (or keep them “safe”)
are more maternal.
This suggestion perhaps finds support in Deborah Threedy’s
observation of “‘freedom of contract’ being associated with the male gender
More recent scholarly literature assessing children’s autonomy often refers to parental
“monitoring” of children, which may often be different from restricting them. See, e.g., Ann C. Crouter
et al., Conditions Underlying Parents’ Knowledge About Children’s Daily Lives in Middle Childhood:
Between- and Within-Family Comparisons, 70 CHILD DEV. 246, 246 (1999) (“Mothers’ knowledge did
not vary as a function of how much they worked outside the home, but fathers knew more about their
children’s activities, whereabouts, and companions when their wives worked longer hours. . . . Both
mothers and fathers knew more about offspring of the same sex than about opposite-sex children . . . .
Perhaps because parental involvement and monitoring are more ‘scripted’ for mothers than fathers,
fathers’ knowledge was more consistently related to their children’s characteristics than was mothers.”);
Nancy Darling & Lauree Tilton-Weaver, All in the Family: Within-Family Differences in Parental
Monitoring and Adolescent Information Management, 55 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 390, 391 (2019)
(“In one of the few studies of monitoring that sampled two children per family, Crouter, Helms-Erikson,
Updegraff, and McHale [1999] measured parents’ knowledge of children’s routine activities by
comparing parent and child reports across 7 days. The correlation between parents’ knowledge of their
two children’s activities was relatively high [r = .41 for mothers and .65 for fathers].”); id. at 399 (“We
were also unable to differentiate maternal from paternal behaviors.”). Studies have compared
protect-by-restricting parenting in different societies, see supra note 9 (quoting Darling), and within our
society of parents with different levels of education, Laura Wray-Lake et al., Developmental Patterns in
Decision-Making Autonomy Across Middle Childhood and Adolescence: European American Parents’
Perspectives, 81 CHILD DEV. 636, 648 (2010) (“Our finding of a positive association between parents’
education and youth decision-making autonomy is consistent with some prior work and with the link
between social class and autonomy found in the broader parenting literature. Our findings did not support
[the] perspective that parents of lower social status offer more autonomy to encourage ‘natural growth’
in their children. Instead, our findings suggest that parents with less formal education may emphasize
parental authority, perhaps to create a safer environment, whereas more educated parents emphasize
self-direction.” (citations omitted)).
Studies address gender in comparing protect-by-restricting of boys compared to such parenting of
girls. See, e.g., id. (“Our results converged with those of several prior studies in documenting that girls
have more autonomy in decisions than do boys. Girls may have greater decision-making autonomy as a
function of their relative maturity. Our results are inconsistent with studies that found no gender
differences or differences favoring boys.” (citations omitted)).
However, research revealed no additional studies (beyond that cited in the first paragraph of this
footnote) focused on differences (or lack of differences) between mothers and fathers with respect to
protect-by-restricting parenting.
194
Joseph William Singer, Anti Anti-Paternalism, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 277, 282 (2016).

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 58

7/28/20 10:47 AM

2020]

PATERNALISM OR GENDER-NEUTRALITY?

587

and ‘paternalism’ with the female gender.”195 Freedom of contract has long
received much of its support from conservatives and libertarians,196 centered
on the Republican Party, which receives most of its votes from men.197
Legally protecting vulnerable parties from harsh contract terms tends to be
emphasized more by progressives and liberals,198 centered on the
Democratic Party, which receives more of its votes from women.199 This

195
Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1261 (1999). Threedy
“admit[s] to some disquiet with gendering ‘freedom of contract’ and ‘paternalism’ in this way.” Id. at
1261 n.79.
196
See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1447, 1454 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)) (“Since the late nineteenth century, American political conservatism
has generally been individualist in economic matters; it has . . . viewed freedom of contract as a
fundamentally important value and resisted attempts to regulate it.”); Jean Braucher, Deception,
Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in
the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 833 (2006) (“[T]he conservative side in the legal
culture war believes customers should insist on warranties to protect themselves against deceptive
practices, and if they don’t, caveat emptor . . . .”); Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words:
Some Realism About the New Formalism (with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 13, 50 (2001) (“[R]ealist/progressive principles such as bad faith and unconscionability
crystallized into consumer protection legislation and agency regulation . . . .”); Robert J. Dignam, There
Is More to Fear Than Fear Itself: The National Labor Relations Board’s Attack on Purposeful and
Necessary Workplace Conduct Rules Must Be Stopped, 52 VAL. U. L. REV. 395, 398 n.13 (2018) (“The
NLRA was opposed by Republicans and big business, and was challenged as an interference with the
‘freedom of contract’ between employers and employees . . . .”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Justice Scalia and
Class Actions: A Loving Critique, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1977, 1990 (2017) (“It is certainly true that
conservatives and libertarians believe in the freedom of contract . . . .”); Robert Hockett, Whose
Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 22 (2005) (“Lochner infamously favored
libertarian-liberal freedom of contract over egalitarian-liberal equalizing of de facto bargaining power
and consequent opportunity.”); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private
Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 173 (2000) (“[C]ontract
doctrine was the site . . . of a[] . . . mildly ideologized debate between conservatives touting freedom of
contract, on one side, and liberals advocating policing bargains in the interests of weak parties, on the
other.”); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 738 (2011)
(“[T]here is some evidence to suggest that the decision by an elected attorney general to take action in
the consumer-protection field is influenced by citizen ideology: Attorneys general from ‘liberal’ states
do more, while those from ‘conservative’ states do less.”); Matthew Lister, Citizenship, in the
Immigration Context, 70 MD. L. REV. 175, 231–32 (2010) (“If there were no limits on what could be
bargained for, this would be a serious problem. Such a system would be a libertarian system (rather than
liberal) that gives unrestricted freedom of contract a place of pride. Liberal theories rightly reject such
unrestricted freedom of contract.” (footnotes omitted)); Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns
in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the
Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 198 (2010)
(referring to “the basic progressive tradition of consumer protection”).
197
Richa Chaturvedi, A Closer Look at the Gender Gap in Presidential Voting, PEW RES. CTR. (July
28,
2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/28/a-closer-look-at-the-gender-gap-inpresidential-voting/.
198
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 196, at 1991–93 (noting that liberals, more so than conservatives,
believe that the government should intervene to regulate the market in efforts to ensure fairness).
199
Chaturvedi, supra note 197.
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“gender gap” in voting has continued since 1980,200 during which time
“Americans have come to view the [two major political] parties increasingly
in gendered terms of masculinity and femininity.”201
Against this background of “[m]asculine Republicans and [f]eminine
Democrats,”202 Deborah Threedy “acknowledg[ing] the irony of labeling
‘paternalism’ as female gendered”203 might highlight how her plausible
reasoning overcomes a misleading label. That is, paternalist may be a
misleadingly inapt label for the protect-by-restricting-choice laws Threedy
plausibly identifies as gendered female. Perhaps maternalism better
describes the justifications for restrictions on contractual freedom—such as
the unconscionability doctrine, usury laws, the minimum wage, and
countless regulations limiting the range of enforceable promises by
consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and others—more supported
by “feminine Democrats” than “masculine Republicans.”
In sum, empirical and conceptual doubt cautions against confidently
concluding that protect-by-restricting-choice parenting is gendered. As
noted
above,
empirical
studies
might
show
whether
“protect-by-restricting-choice” parenting is gendered, that is, whether it is
significantly more common among parents of any particular gender.
However, any such data would reflect the social and historical context in
which it was gathered.204 Consequently, reasonable people might disagree
200

Id.
Nicholas J. G. Winter, Masculine Republicans and Feminine Democrats: Gender and
Americans’ Explicit and Implicit Images of the Political Parties, 32 POL. BEHAV. 587, 587 (2010),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9131-z.
201

During the past three decades Americans have come to view the parties increasingly
in gendered terms of masculinity and femininity. Utilizing three decades of American
National Election Studies data and the results of a cognitive reaction-time experiment,
this paper demonstrates empirically that these connections between party images and
gender stereotypes have been forged at the explicit level of the traits that Americans
associate with each party, and also at the implicit level of unconscious cognitive
connections between gender and party stereotypes.
Id.

202

Id.
Threedy, supra note 195, at 1261 n.79.
204
Huang, supra note 192, at 778–80 (“Surely, differing perceptions about what being maternalistic
versus being paternalistic mean reflect cultural and social conventions about gender roles.”); Cathy J.
Jones, College Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision to Return to Play, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 113, 198
n.414 (1992) (quoting Cathy J. Jones, Sexist Language: An Overview for Teachers and Librarians, 82
LAW LIBR. J. 673, 679 n.18 (1990) (“A word that I now use consistently is parentalistic in place of
paternalistic. . . . While, historically, paternalism may not have been inaccurate, given that most
perceived authority figures in either the public or private realm were (white) men, the meaning to be
conveyed has also always connoted the relationship between a parent-figure and a child-figure.
Therefore, parentalism is both accurate (in terms of the meaning I wish to convey) and gender-neutral.”));
Singer, supra note 194, at 282 (“The concepts of paternalism and maternalism get their meaning from
the social and historical context in which fathering and mothering occur. The family has changed over
time as have the relations between parents and children.”).
203
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on how much data across time and place would be sufficient to show that
“protect-by-restricting-choice” parenting is sufficiently gendered to justify
gendered language when analogizing protect-by-restricting-choice laws to
parenting. Our usual presumption for gender-neutral language counsels for
using the gender-neutral parentalist to describe such laws and policies
aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their choices in the
absence of sufficient data showing that the analogous parenting behavior is
sufficiently gendered to justify gendered language (“paternalism” or
“maternalism”) to describe such laws.
4. Paternalism’s Negative Connotations Exclude It from Case for
Gender-Neutral Language
Even one who does not believe all our laws are gendered male, or that
protecting-by-restricting-choice is gendered male, might believe that
describing laws aiming to protect people (of all genders) by restricting their
choices with the gendered word paternalism is consistent with the reasons
driving our society’s move toward gender-neutral language because
paternalism’s connotations are negative.205 In other words, one might
believe that, while gendered words attaching positive connotations to men
(such as chairman or fireman) tend to relegate women to secondary status,
because paternalism attaches negative connotations to men it does not
relegate women to secondary status.
However, the strong and widely accepted arguments for ordinarily using
gender-neutral language are not only that gendered language relegates
women to secondary status, but also that gendered language reduces
women’s visibility. “For example, feminist scholars have long decried that
masculine generics are androcentric, and make women seem invisible . . .
.”206 Language reducing women’s visibility thereby relegates women to
secondary status, not only with respect to positive associations (such as
chairman or fireman) but with respect to any associations of being capable
adults, including negative associations.
It is perhaps entirely appropriate for men to bear the burdens of negative
connotations associated with the plainly gendered paternalism (discussed in
Section II) of male dominance or an attitude especially characteristic of men

205
Negative connotations of the word paternalism stretch from at least as far back as Locke and
Kant to a contemporary law student editor’s observation that “[p]aternalism is often used because it stems
from male dominance and how men treat people, and thus carries a negative connotation.” See supra
note 7; see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Peter H. Huang, Positive Parentalism, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 26,
2009),
https://www.law.com//nationallawjournal/almID/1202427700551/?id=1202427700551
(“Paternalism is a dirty word. The ‘nanny state,’ ‘Big Brother’ and similar terms invoke the dire specter
of government intruding on individuals’ thoughts, behavior and choices.”).
206
Prewitt-Freilino et al., supra note 30, at 270.
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or directed primarily toward women.207 But if any negative connotations
encumber parentalism—the gender-neutral description of laws aiming to
protect people (of all genders) by restricting their choices—then using that
gender-neutral word appropriately spreads the burden of those negative
connotations on women who enact or support those laws, as well as on men
who enact or support those laws.
Moreover,
negative
connotations
associated
with
protect-by-restricting-choice laws may be reduced by shifting our
descriptions of them from paternalist to parentalist. Peter Huang contrasts
the negative connotations of paternalism with the positive connotations of
maternalism and the relatively neutral connotations of parentalism:
Interestingly, an on-line dictionary and thesaurus defines
maternalism as “1. the quality of having or showing the
tenderness and warmth and affection of or befitting a mother”
and “2. motherly care; behaviour characteristic of a mother;
the practice of acting as a mother does toward her children.”
In contrast, another on-line encyclopedia defines paternalism,
as “the interference of a state or an individual with another
person, against their will, and justified by a claim that the
person interfered with will be better off or protected from
harm.” Therefore, in what follows, the word paternalism is
utilized following convention, but a better gender-neutral term
is that of parentalism, which should evoke more neutral
connotations and emotions than either maternalism or
paternalism does.208
Huang’s conclusion is strong: “a better gender-neutral term is that of
parentalism,” in part because it “evoke[s] more neutral connotations and
emotions than either maternalism or paternalism.”209 In short, a virtue of
using the word parentalism is that its relatively neutral connotations help
discussions of protect-by-restricting-choice laws to assess those laws on
their merits with a minimum of distractingly loaded rhetoric, while
nevertheless concisely capturing the similarities between such laws and
207
Several uses of paternalism in this plainly-gendered sense seem to have accentuated the negative
connotations of paternalism by removing even the pretext that the paternalists restrict choice to protect.
In the following examples, the male paternalists seem to be described as seeking to harm, rather than
protect, women. See Knouse, supra note 49, at 139 (“[Women] are subordinated by the inherent
paternalism [of mandatory ultrasounds]; they are manipulated by the compromised informed consent
procedure and inherent pro-life bias . . . .”); London, supra note 49, at 405 (referring to an “attempt by
the paternalistic, male-dominated medical establishment to exploit women’s reproductive capabilities to
serve its own interests”); Schultz, supra note 49, at 2087 (“[M]ale bosses reinforce paternalistic authority
by harassing or belittling women in traditionally female fields who dared to step out of their proper
place.”).
208
Huang, supra note 192, at 779–80 (footnotes omitted).
209
Id. at 780.
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parenting. Both such laws and parenting aim to protect people by restricting
those people’s choices.
IV. THE CASE FOR PARENTALISM AS THE GENDER-NEUTRAL SUBSTITUTE
FOR “PATERNALISM”
A. Many Legal Scholars Already Use Parentalism as a Gender-Neutral
Substitute for “Paternalism”
1. Introduction
Thus far, this Article has summarized the widely accepted reasons for
ordinarily using gender-neutral language, except when seeking to convey a
gendered meaning and argued that this approach should be applied to
paternalism. So, we should use that gendered word when conveying a
gendered meaning, but otherwise, we should use a gender-neutral word.
While writers could suggest a different gender-neutral word—anything from
“protectivism” to “dictatorship”210—to describe laws or policies that protect
people by restricting their choices, it is better to stick with parentalism in
part because many legal scholars already use it as the gender-neutral
replacement for paternalism. As the English language evolves through the
word choices of millions of individual speakers and writers,211 and decades
of those choices have made significant progress toward a good outcome
(parentalism replacing paternalism as the usual word for laws protecting
people by restricting them), prudence counsels for encouraging that progress
by “going with the flow” of parentalism rather than trying to “turn back the
tides” in its favor and diverting gender-neutral writers toward some different
word. In other words, don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
2. Articles Citing Gender-Neutrality as the Reason for Using
Parentalism
This Article has argued that the widely accepted reasons for using
gender-neutral language apply to the gendered word paternalism, so writers
should use this word only when manifesting an intent to convey a gendered
meaning and otherwise should use the gender-neutral parentalism.
Fortunately, many legal scholars already do this, and several have cited
gender-neutrality as their reason for using parentalism rather than
paternalism. This perhaps began in 1987 with Marcy Strauss defining
210
See also Singer, supra note 194, at 282 (“Why ‘paternalism’? Why not ‘maternalism’? Or better
yet, something gender-neutral like ‘dictatorship’? What is being conveyed by the paternalism moniker is
control—the idea that decisions are being made by someone else. If that is the core notion, then a
gender-neutral term would do as well.”).
211
JOHN MCWHORTER, WORDS ON THE MOVE: WHY ENGLISH WON’T —AND CAN’T—SIT STILL
(LIKE, LITERALLY) 1–5, 9–10 (1st ed. 2016).
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parentalism “as ‘interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs,
interests or values of the person being coerced,’”212 and explaining “[t]he
term paternalism is sex-linked; it is drawn from the role of the father in the
family. Parentalism reflects, in a more egalitarian fashion, the same
principles.”213
Several other legal scholars also cite gender-neutrality as their reason
for using the word parentalist rather than paternalist:
•

“A word that I now use consistently is parentalistic in
place of paternalistic. As I use these words, I mean to
convey a policy or practice of regulation by one
person (or entity) of another, based on the belief that
the authority figure, rather than the individual
affected, can better determine what is in the best
interests of the individual affected and can better make
decisions for and protect that individual. While,
historically, paternalism may not have been
inaccurate, given that most perceived authority figures
in either the public or private realm were (white) men,
the meaning to be conveyed has also always connoted
the relationship between a parent-figure and a
child-figure. Therefore, parentalism is both accurate
(in terms of the meaning I wish to convey) and
gender-neutral.”214

•

“I say ‘parentalism’ rather than ‘paternalism’ in part
to avoid the latter term’s connotations of officious
intermeddling, but primarily to use a gender-neutral
synonym. At least in my own experience, concern for
another’s welfare combined with a claim of superior
insight into the other’s needs can come from a parent
of either sex.”215

•

“The first objection one might have to paternalism, as
used here, is that it reproduces a highly gendered
picture of power. It is possible, of course, to speak of
parentalism rather than paternalism. Indeed, Locke
himself suggests just such a formulation. The model

212
Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for
Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 321 (1987).
213
Id. at 321 n.34.
214
Cathy J. Jones, Sexist Language: An Overview for Teachers and Librarians, 82 LAW LIBR. J.
673, 679 n.18 (1990).
215
Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 523 n.73 (1990).
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of power suggested by the relation of parents and
children is manifestly one to which women are clearly
equal (if not stronger) claimants.”216
•

“[O]ut of parentalism (the gender-neutral version of
‘paternalism’) . . . there are surely cases in which such
parentalism is justified, such as when parents try to
inculcate in their children a taste for education or
classical music.”217

In addition, a great many other legal scholars also use the gender-neutral
parentalism to describe laws or policies aiming to protect people by
restricting their choices. Several are quoted in the following subsections.
3. Parentalism in Restricting Contractual Choices
Many legal scholars use the word parentalism to describe laws or
policies aiming to protect people by restricting their choices of contract
terms:
•

“From early on, there was basic agreement that
mandatory restrictions on freedom of contract could
only be justified by efforts to protect parties inside the
contract (parentalism) or parties outside the contract
(externalities). Important disagreements remained as
to the appropriate scope of these ‘exceptions.’”218

•

“[I]mmutable rules are justifiable if society wants to
protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties
outside the contract. The former justification turns on
parentalism; the latter on externalities. Immutable
rules displace freedom of contract. Immutability is
justified only if unregulated contracting would be
socially deleterious because parties internal or
external to the contract cannot adequately protect
themselves.”219

•

“[B]argains between contracting parties are not
always Pareto efficient. Immutable contract rules are
generally justified precisely for this reason, on

216

Jonathan Simon, Power Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1373 (1995) (footnote omitted).
217
Jonathan Baron, Value Analysis of Political Behavior—Self-Interested: Moralistic: Altruistic :
Moral, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1147 (2003).
218
Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 886 (2003) (footnote
omitted).
219
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 88 (footnote omitted).
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or

third-party

•

“RUPA reaches a compromise between the
‘libertarians’ who would like to see the parties held to
their contracts and the ‘parentalists’ who support
mandatory fiduciary duties . . . .”221

•

“RUPA was drafted with the intention of replacing
parentalism with freedom of contract as the
overarching principle of the Act. In doing so, the
drafters assumed that, in most cases, partnership
agreements are not adhesion contracts involving
inequality of bargaining power.”222

•

“Anti-contractarians, called parentalists by some,
argue that fiduciary duties owed by partners should be
both broad and non-waivable.”223

As the relevant contracting parties may be of any gender, these articles
rightly use the gender-neutral parentalist rather than paternalist to describe
the laws or policies aiming to protect them by restricting their choices.
4. Parentalism in Restricting Consumers’ Choices
Other law review articles use parentalism to describe laws or policies
aiming to protect consumers or investors by restricting their choices:
•

“[L]aws [that] take that discretion away from the
consumer” are “‘parentalist’ restrictions on
autonomy.”224

•

“[I]ndividuals are not autonomous subjects, but are
highly susceptible to manipulation and persuasion. If
individuals are so suggestible that some will
predictably engage in clearly self-destructive behavior
. . . then perhaps a more parentalist approach is in

220
Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of
Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109, 175 (2002).
221
Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as “Employees”
Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 3, 44 (2004) (footnote omitted).
222
Elisa Feldman, Your Partner’s Keeper: The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 1931, 1946–47 (1995).
223
Samuel J. Samaro, The Case for Fiduciary Duty as a Restraint on Employer Opportunism Under
Sales Commission Agreements, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 441, 487 (2006) (footnote omitted).
224
Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With A Contractualist
Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 214 n.97 (1998).
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order. Regulation of cigarette advertising is among the
best examples.”225
•

Risk of “hedge fund failures . . . can be an acceptable
part of the larger array of risks investors understand to
be a coincident part of their participation in the
financial markets. Americans have never been fond of
parentalism in law and the subprime mortgage
situation does not present a compelling reason to now
move against the grain.”226

•

“[R]etirement plan funding still operates under the
substantial control of employers. Young employees
especially . . . ought to bristle against the effective
parentalism (employers and government have become
co-parents) that still serves as the basic premise for the
American retirement plan system. Many employees
apprehensively wonder whether full Social Security
benefits will exist when their turn to retire arrives.”227

As the relevant consumers or investors may be of any gender, these
articles rightly use the gender-neutral parentalist rather than paternalist to
describe the laws or policies aiming to protect them by restricting their
choices.
5. Parentalism in Restricting Medical Patients’ Choices
A variety of legal scholars use parentalism to describe laws or policies
aiming to protect medical patients by restricting their choices:
•

“[One of] several ways of interpreting this possible
exercise of exclusive power in withholding treatment
[is] . . . as a parentalist exercise of professional power
on behalf of the patient and/or family.”228

•

“Some critics maintain that, when doctors seek to
determine medical futility unilaterally, they are
engaging in an unjustifiable parentalist exercise of
power.”229

225
Laura W. Brill, Note, The First Amendment and the Power of Suggestion: Protecting
“Negligent” Speakers in Cases of Imitative Harm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 1007 n.152 (1994).
226
Carl Hasselbarth, How Should We Regulate Hedge Funds?, 16 PIABA B.J. 233, 264 (2009).
227
Richard J. Kovach, A Critique of SIMPLE—Yet Another Tax-Favored Retirement Plan, 32 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 401, 437 (1998).
228
William F. May, Testing the Medical Covenant: Caring for Patients with Advanced Dementia,
40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 45, 46 (2012).
229
Id. at 47.
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•

“In the view of many clinicians, a reasonable
risk-benefit calculation would not favor a decision to
release an acutely psychotic patient without treatment,
notwithstanding the patient’s own competent advance
instructions. Releasing the patient would seem to
require quite strong support for the value of patient
autonomy over beneficent parentalism.”230

•

“[A physician healer] distinguished himself clearly
from the other specialists [the patient] had seen, who
said only, ‘You should immediately do what I
recommend.’ But he also distinguished himself from
the many physicians who mistakenly believe that the
only way to avoid that brand of parentalism is to
provide a raft of information at arms’ length—‘it’s
your choice’—because they are afraid that they may
unduly influence the patient’s decision simply by
making a recommendation.”231

•

“[I]t would be beneficent parentalism at its worst to
prejudge the likely outcome for a particular patient
who could be given the opportunity to try protease
inhibitors. Thus, all patients must be given a chance to
benefit from the new therapies, as well as the support
system necessary to make a chance worth taking.”232

As the relevant medical patients may be of any gender, these articles
rightly use the gender-neutral parentalist rather than paternalist to describe
the laws or policies aiming to protect them by restricting their choices.
6. Parentalism in Restricting Children’s Choices
Some articles in law journals use parentalism to describe laws or
policies aiming to protect children by restricting their choices:
•

“The right to marry can be limited if the state has a
strong justification for doing so. A fourteen-year-old
girl’s right to marry can be limited for standard
parentalist reasons: the adolescent’s decisionmaking
capacities are not fully developed, and she is prone to

230

Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Overriding Psychiatric Advance Directives: Factors Associated with
Psychiatrists’ Decisions to Preempt Patients’ Advance Refusal of Hospitalization and Medication, 31
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 77, 86 (2007).
231
Nancy M. P. King, The Reasonable Patient and the Healer, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 343, 358–
59 (2015).
232
Linda C. Fentiman, AIDS as a Chronic Illness: A Cautionary Tale for the End of the Twentieth
Century, 61 ALB. L. REV. 989, 1007–08 (1998).
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poor choices, especially if made under the influence
of an older lover.”233
•

“Bans on the tattooing of minors of course present a
more complicated problem. In general, the state is
permitted to exercise parentalism toward children.
However, parentalism toward children is highly
problematic with respect to freedom of dress because
the exercise of freedom of dress is crucial as a child,
given its special role in the development of social
identity for children. . . . However, certain forms of
body modification are rather long-lasting and, as a
result, the experimentation that is normally associated
with adolescent freedom of dress is fraught with
permanence when it comes to tattooing, as well as
body modifications more permanent than simple
piercings.”234

•

“[P]arentalist legislation [that is intended to protect
children (using the internet) in spaces where parents
may not necessarily regulate online or in-game
activity] is likely to disrupt speech and ultimately
break up virtual world communities. . . . [T]his
balkanization will isolate children from the very
communities that protect them. . . . [T]he virtual
worlds industry may be able to avoid this by
developing better filters to protect children in virtual
worlds.”235

As the relevant children may be of any gender, these articles rightly use
the gender-neutral parentalist rather than paternalist to describe the laws or
policies aiming to protect them by restricting their choices.
7. Parentalism in Restricting Choices by a Wide Variety of Other
Parties
Many other examples of legal scholarship use parentalism to describe
laws or policies aiming to protect various types of people by restricting their
choices:
•

“We teach, perhaps too much, that lawyers should
respect their clients’ autonomy and that lawyers

233
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Three Cultural Anxieties Undermining the Case for Same-Sex
Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 307, 314 (1998).
234
Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle,
Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 77 (2006).
235
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Parentalism, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1215, 1217 (2009).
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should protect their clients’ rights to determine their
own objectives. Parentalism is ‘out.’ Client autonomy
and self-actualization are ‘in’—not merely as matters
of the ethics of lawyering but also as a practical result
of the economic nature of the attorney-client
relationship.”236
•

“[R]ather than focusing on people’s poor judgment
and decision making, governments should develop
legal policy to foster people’s flourishing. Instead of
working to stop an individual from making mistakes
or suffering from cognitive biases, such positive
parentalism seeks to build on people’s signature
strengths and character virtues. The literature on loss
aversion suggests that people might perceive
interventions more favorably when they are framed
not as an intrusion into one’s autonomy but instead as
encouragement toward, or in aid of, a beneficial
outcome.”237

•

“[A scholar] contrasted the independence that
accompanies earning with the dependence of welfare
beneficiaries who are ‘treated with that mixture of
parentalism and contempt that has always been
reserved for the dependent classes.’”238

•

“Requiring deeper or more detailed rational
understanding [by a criminal defendant, waiving the
right to counsel or pleading guilty, of the
circumstances and consequences of those actions]
risks parentalism, but requiring less risks an unjust
outcome. I have a preference for limiting parentalism
as much as possible and perhaps the Court’s
recognition that the [criminal] defendant must actually
waive his rights knowingly partially remedies the
vagueness of the general test. On the other hand,
defining knowing or intelligent is as vulnerable to
manipulation as defining competence itself. In short,

236
Peter G. Glenn, Some Thoughts About Developing Constructive Approaches to Lawyer and Law
Student Distress, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 69, 71–72 (1996).
237
Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 405, 422
(2010).
238
Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 523, 570 (1997).
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evaluating any competence case is a normatively
fraught and difficult enterprise.”239
•

“Some disabled individuals certainly face a possibility
of neglect or abuse if left on their own. The problem
is that, taken too far, professional behavior driven by
the desire to help and protect disabled clients can
diverge widely from the client’s goals of choice and
satisfaction, reinforce learned helplessness, and
amount to parentalism rather than support.”240

•

“Which of the two evils is more damaging?
Proponents of outing assert that secrecy is more
damaging than revelation, both to individual and
community. But the parentalism of that argument
marks the question as the wrong one to ask. Whether
one is entirely open about his or her sexual orientation
should be a personal choice made after an individual
determination of the costs and benefits of each.”241

•

“Peck’s testimony reflects the Pentagon’s new
‘kinder, gentler’ homophobia, which now justifies the
gaylesbian exclusion as at least in part designed to
protect lesbians and gay men. But beneath this
perhaps sincere parentalism is the intimation that the
armed forces cannot or will not control or regulate the
violent impulses of their own troops. A gaylegal
perspective contributes the insight that the violence
Peck predicts is a self-fulfilling prophecy, a result of
the military’s own policies.”242

•

“I argue against the use of autonomy as a basis for
property-like fundamental rights in the body or any
other form of property that would trump typical
political concerns such as public health or even
parentalism.”243

239

Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885,
918 (2011).
240
Marshall B. Kapp, Enhancing Autonomy and Choice in Selecting and Directing Long-Term Care
Services, 4 ELDER L.J. 55, 73 (1996).
241
Kathleen Guzman, About Outing: Public Discourse, Private Lives, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1531,
1549 (1995).
242
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 640 (1994).
243
Gowri Ramachandran, Against the Right to Bodily Integrity: Of Cyborgs and Human Rights, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009).
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•

“Perhaps the most difficult issue presented by
sadomasochism is the legitimacy of parentalism: can
the state regulate conduct that does physical harm to
an individual, even if the individual has freely
consented? The same issue is presented by the
regulation of suicide, and a wide range of other
personally harmful conduct.”244

•

“[T]he greater the coercion needing to be justified
(say, in terms of how much liberty it undermines), the
more important the behavior in question must be; and
parentalism, for normal adults, is ruled out. According
to this view, then, we may coerce people to do only
what they would autonomously do if appropriately
informed and fully rational.”245

•

“[A] true regulatory maze, representing parentalism,
rigidness, and top-down regulation. In Atlantis, [by
contrast,] the Queen has always favored individual
freedom, flexibility, and self-regulation.”246

•

“Allowing
[faculty
with
non-traditional
appointments] to vote in committees and not in faculty
meetings, as some schools do, simply smacks of
parentalism.”247

As the relevant protected-and-restricted parties may be of any gender,
these articles rightly use the gender-neutral parentalist rather than
paternalist to describe the laws or policies aiming to protect them by
restricting their choices.
8. Summary
This Section has shown that a great many scholars use parentalism
rather than paternalism to describe laws or policies aiming to protect people
by restricting their choices. While one writer may be read to denigrate the
gender-neutrality of parentalism as “politically correct,”248 several scholars
244
David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment
Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 351 (1994).
245
Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 677, 689 (1993).
246
Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 229, 236 (2004).
247
Susan P. Liemer, The Hierarchy of Law School Faculty Meetings: Who Votes?, 73 UMKC L.
REV. 351, 369 (2004).
248
Diana Nordlund, Form Reform: Documenting Emergency Department Informed Consent, 12
T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 415, 419 (2010) (“As late as the 1950s, the pervasive attitude was
‘doctor knows best.’ This attitude is also known as paternalism (or, in politically correct circles,
parentalism) and exceeds the bounds of beneficence entailed by the doctor-patient relationship.
Paternalism has been widely discredited by modern scholarship.” (footnotes omitted)).
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have cited gender-neutrality as their reason for using the gender-neutral
word, and many other writers—perhaps accustomed to the norm of
gender-neutral language—use parentalism without needing to explain their
choice of words. This progress will hopefully continue as parentalism
replaces paternalism, much as flight attendant is replacing stewardess and
firefighter is replacing fireman.
B. Legal Scholarship’s Other Use of the Word Parentalism
While many legal scholars now often use parentalism to describe laws
or policies that protect people by restricting their choices, other legal
scholars use parentalism in a very different context, to describe views about
the primacy of parents (as opposed to government) in raising children. A
leading example is Stephen Gilles’ On Educating Children: A Parentalist
Manifesto,249 which “provides a broad conception of parental authority
[based on beliefs] that parents are more likely to act in their children’s best
interest and that parental control over their children’s values must be
superior to the state’s interest.”250 Several other scholars use the word
“parentalist” similarly, for instance, explaining that “[f]or many parentalists,
the right to parent is considered a time-honored staple of personal liberty
deeply rooted in the common law and guaranteed by core constitutional
principles,”251 or referring to “the disagreement between statists and
‘parentalists’” “when it comes to government regulation of education.”252
249

Stephen Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 1033–
34 (1996) (concluding that “individual parents should be free to pass on their values to their children
[through reasonable educational choices] and to reject state efforts to try to inculcate contrary values”).
See also Stephen G. Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children’s Educational Rights, 26 CAP. U. L. REV.
9, 9 (1997) (“The central tenet of liberal parentalism, as I conceive it, is that as a matter of liberal political
theory states should defer to parents’ educational choices unless they are plainly unreasonable. This is
parentalism because it gives parents primary authority over and responsibility for their own children,
while relegating government to the important but secondary role of backstop against parental
wrongdoing. It is liberal both because it sharply limits the state’s role in the upbringing of children, and
because it limits parents’ educational and custodial authority over them.” (footnotes omitted)).
250
Courtenay E. Moran, How to Regulate Homeschooling: Why History Supports the Theory of
Parental Choice, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1061, 1079 (discussing Gilles, On Educating Children, supra note
249).
251
Jeffrey Shulman, Meyer, Pierce, and the History of the Entire Human Race: Barbarism, Social
Progress, and (the Fall and Rise of) Parental Rights, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 337, 344 (2016).
252
Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to
Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 119 (2000). See also Josh Chafetz, Social Reproduction and
Religious Reproduction: A Democratic-Communitarian Analysis of the Yoder Problem, 15 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 263, 266 (2006) (“I reject the parentalist case as incomplete because it fails to consider
the complex web of social relations that constitutes a child’s value set. It is only by misunderstanding the
complexity of social relations that parentalist theorists can conclude that the parents are the only
legitimate source of values for the child or that compulsory public schooling will stifle social dissent.”);
B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1320 (2015) (“The birth of
children’s constitutional rights, as distinct from those of their parents, may be loosely viewed as an
outcropping or extension of the liberal view, which emphasizes the state’s role in shaping future citizens
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Consequently, separate strands of legal scholarship use the word
parentalist differently, with one strand using parentalist to refer to laws or
policies aiming to protect people, usually adults, by restricting their choices,
while another strand uses parentalist to describe supporters of parents (over
government) in raising children. Fortunately, these two uses of the same
word are unlikely to produce confusion because context quickly clarifies any
ambiguity. If the context surrounding a particular use of parentalist does not
involve children, then parentalist refers to laws or policies aiming to protect
people, usually adults, by restricting their choices. And even if the context
surrounding a particular use of parentalist involves children, that context
nearly always quickly reveals whether parentalist describes: (A) a law
restricting children’s choices, or (B) supporters of parents (over
government) in raising children. In sum, the case for parentalist as the
and promoting liberal values, while still leaving room for parents to inculcate their own values. Familial
rights, by contrast, fit more comfortably within the parentalist tradition, which embodies a traditional
view, grounded in natural law, of the family as existing outside of, and largely beyond the reach of, the
state.”); Linda C. McClain, Against Agnosticism: Why the Liberal State Isn’t Just One (Authority) Among
the Many, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1319, 1343 (2013) (“[One scholar] rejected these sorts of parentalist
manifestos [that parents may control their children’s education entirely] because they are contrary to a
model of divided or fractured power and multiple sources of authority.”); Linda C. McClain & James E.
Fleming, Foreword: Legal and Constitutional Implications of the Calls to Revive Civil Society, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289, 295 (2000) (“[A]t least where the education of children is involved, [one scholar]
cautions against a ‘parentalist’ approach to strengthening the institutions of civil society against the state,
and suggests that, for children to reap the benefit of multiple repositories of power, both schools and
parents should play a role in shaping and educating children.”); Sean T. McLaughlin, Some Strings
Attached? Federal Private School Vouchers and the Regulation Carousel, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 857,
870 (2003) (“From the parentalist perspective, subjecting a private school’s entire administration and
curriculum to state approval threatens religious freedom and parental autonomy over their child’s best
interests.”); Eric Rassbach, Coming Soon to a Court Near You: Religious Male Circumcision, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1347, 1357 (“In its most extreme form, the anti-parentalist school would eliminate parental
rights altogether. For example, Yale Law School scholar Samantha Godwin has challenged the very
existence of parental rights, including, but not limited to, parental rights concerning religious
upbringing.”); Shulman, supra note 251, at 344 (“[P]arentalists argue that state interference with parental
decision-making erodes the historical—and perhaps timeless—bedrock of fundamental personal
liberties.”); Jeffrey Shulman, The Parent as (Mere) Educational Trustee: Whose Education Is It,
Anyway?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 290, 299 (2010) (“The law has long recognized that the state’s duty to educate
children is superior to any parental right. Indeed, the ‘parentalist’ position to the contrary rests on an
inflation of rights that is, in fact, a radical departure from longstanding legal norms.”); Jeffrey Shulman,
Who Owns the Soul of the Child?: An Essay on Religious Parenting Rights and the Enfranchisement of
the Child, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 385, 426–27 (2012) (“Parentalists who paint the public education
system as ideologically monolithic and propose greater educational choice rarely purport to be the
guardians of the child’s educational options. What the parentalist seeks to protect is the parent’s choice
‘to reject schooling that promotes values contrary to their own.’” (citation omitted)); Aviam Soifer,
Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition of Voluntary Peonage, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1607, 1633 (2012) (“Yet we ought to recognize that our parents and teachers exercise
paternalism toward and for us repeatedly, to both good and ill effect. Even if the letters of ‘paternalism’
were rearranged to become ‘parentalism,’ however, the question of how to ascertain genuine consent
looms large and lasts for a long time in most families as well as in the law. This typically is the case on
both sides of the parent-child equation.”).
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gender-neutral replacement for paternalist is not significantly weakened by
a separate use of parentalist with a different meaning in other contexts.
CONCLUSION
The strong and widely accepted reasons for using gender-neutral
language presumptively apply to the gendered word paternalism and its
gender-neutral counterpart, parentalism. So, we should begin with a
presumption for using the gender-neutral word parentalism, while using
paternalism only when emphasizing the important relevance of gender or
otherwise trying to convey a gendered meaning. Accordingly, many legal
scholars define paternalism in an expressly gendered way—such as “the
institutionalization of male dominance,”253 or an “ideology [that] teaches
men to minimize women’s agency”254—or fittingly use paternalism to
describe an attitude especially characteristic of men or directed primarily
toward women. All these many uses of the gendered word paternalism are
supported by the writers’ apparent intent to emphasize the important
relevance of gender to the writers’ points.
On the other hand, and despite the spread of gender-neutral language
throughout our society and legal profession, many legal scholars continue to
use the gendered word paternalism without indicating any important
relevance of gender or otherwise manifesting intent to convey a gendered
meaning. These many writers use paternalism rather than parentalism to
describe laws or policies aiming to protect people (of all genders) by
restricting their choices. For example, these writers cite “paternalism” as:
•

one of only two standard justifications for restricting
freedom of contract or other private ordering;

•

a standard justification for restrictions on contractual
choice, including the unconscionability doctrine,
usury laws, the minimum wage, and countless
regulations limiting the range of enforceable promises
by consumers, borrowers, employees, investors, and
others; and

•

the basis for variants of like “libertarian paternalism”
and “soft paternalism.”

In each of these contexts, it would be better to use the gender-neutral
word parentalism, unless the writer emphasizes the relevance of gender or
otherwise manifests an intent to convey a gendered meaning. For example,
a writer could justify using the gendered word paternalism by arguing that
all our laws are gendered male so gendered language should be used to
253
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Kennedy, supra note 43, at 59.
Fraser, supra note 11, at 165.
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discuss any law, including using paternalism to describe laws aiming to
protect people of all genders by restricting their choices. Or a writer could
justify using the gendered word paternalism by arguing (after citing
sufficient empirical data) that protect-by-restricting-choice parenting is
gendered male, so analogous protect-by-restricting-choice laws and policies
are also gendered male.
Absent one of those two plausible arguments justifying use of the
gendered word paternalism, laws or policies aiming to protect people of all
genders by restricting their choices are better described as examples of
parentalism. While other legal scholars use the word parentalist, in a very
different context, to describe views about the primacy of parents (as opposed
to government) in raising children, this use of parentalist rarely produces
confusion with use of parentalist to refer to laws or policies aiming to protect
people, usually adults, by restricting their choices, because context quickly
clarifies any ambiguity. So, the case for parentalist as the gender-neutral
replacement for paternalist is not significantly weakened by a separate use
of parentalist with a different meaning.
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